On 2/10/2015 10:38 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 12:23 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 2/10/2015 10:11 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 12:03 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 2/10/2015 9:40 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 8:35 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 2/10/2015 5:29 PM, LizR wrote:
On 5 February 2015 at 09:19, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 2/4/2015 11:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Feb 2015, at 20:13, Jason Resch wrote:
I agree with John. If consciousness had no third-person
observable
effects, it would be an epiphenomenon. And then there is no way
to
explain why we're even having this discussion about
consciousness.
So we all agree on this.
?? Why aren't first person observable effects enough to discuss?
I guess because if there are no third-person observable effects of
consciousness, then I can't detect any other conscious entities to
discuss the effects with...
The epiphenomenon model says there are third-person observable
effects of
the phenomenon, which suffice for detecting other entities.
Whether the
other entities are really conscious or just faking it is a matter of
inference.
Did you mean to say "The epiphenomenon model says there are *no*
third-person
observable effects of the phenomenon" ?
Of course not. The phenomenon is what is observable, by definition.
It's the
epiphenomenon which is not third-person observable.
But in the epiphenomenon model, consciousness is the epiphenomenon and the
phenomenal part of consciousness is its first-person aspect.
The statement was, "there are no third-person observable effects of
consciousness".
Yes this is the conventional meaning of epihenominalism (in philosophy of mind).
In the epiphenomenal theory of consciousness, I take the phenomenon to be
the
observable behavior, neuron firings, etc. and consciousness the
corresponding
epiphenomenon.
Okay.
Those phenomenon do have third person observable effects and in general
that's how
we infer consciousness in others.
I agree. But I think epiphenominalism is false, because that it places consciousness
outside the causal chain of physics, making it "extra physical" ineffectual, and for all
intents and purposes, unnecessary (it declares no ability to ever move beyond solipsism
as far as determining whether some other thing or process is conscious or not).
Those sound like reasons you don't like it, not reasons it's false. Are you echoing JKC's
line that if consciousness is not effacious evolution would have removed it? If
consciousness were unnecessary it would not be an epiphenomenon, i.e. something that
NECESSARILY accompanies the phenomena of thoughts. Is heat necessary to random molecular
motion?
Brent
"What we are continually talking of, merely from our having
been continually talking of it, we imagine we understand."
--- Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832)
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