On Sun, Feb 22, 2015 at 3:17 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 2/22/2015 9:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 21 Feb 2015, at 02:50, meekerdb wrote: > > On 2/20/2015 8:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > QM + collapse is inconsistent (with a great variety of principle, like > computationalism, God does not play dice, no spooky actions, etc.). > > > Principles of Platonist faith. > > > You don't need any faith to disbelieve in the opportunity to invoke > magical thing in the explanation. > > It is up to those who make extraordinary claims to provide the evidences. > > > Computationalism is an extraordinary claim. > For it to be extraordinary, it would have to be beyond ordinary. However computationalism isn't just ordinary but its the majority opinion among philosophers of mind. > That some things may happen at random isn't. > > If random events were so common, why has no scientist ever detected a conclusively objectively random phenomenon? Why is every phenomenon among all theories in physics is deterministic (with the notable exception of wave-function collapse (which Everett showed can be explained as a deterministic phenomenon without having to assume it as a separate postulate/phenomenon beyond the deterministic, linear and reversible equations of QM))? > > > > It is a theorem of comp, also. The many worlds, in his relative state > formulation, is already a consequence of computationalism. By church > thesis, *all* computations are emulated in all possible ways in elementary > arithmetic, with a typical machine-independent redundancy: it makes the > notion of "world" formulable, > > > Does it? What's the definition of a world in comp? > > > > It is a model of "my beliefs", assuming I am consistent (so that such a > model exist). > > > That would comport with quantum bayesianism. > > > You can handle the world by notion like maximal consistent sets of > formula, which in this case can have oracle like answering W or M when > opening a door after a self-duplication. A world can satisfy a belief like > "I belief in PA and I am currently located at Washington". > > > But those are just words. Does Washington have to exist in a world? Or > just propositions containing "Washington". Without some referents every > two propositions not of the form "X and not-X" will be consistent. "I'm in > Washington." and "I'm in Moscow." are consistent unless we have a theory of > existence in spacetime and some referents for "Washington" and "Moscow". > > It looks like you prefer "many words" over "many worlds": http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9709032 It is argued that since all the above-mentioned approaches to nonrelativistic quantum mechanics give identical cookbook prescriptions for how to calculate things in practice, practical-minded experimentalists, who have traditionally adopted the ``shut-up-and-calculate interpretation'', typically show little interest in whether cozy classical concepts are in fact real in some untestable metaphysical sense or merely the way we subjectively perceive a mathematically simpler world where the Schrodinger equation describes everything - and that they are therefore becoming less bothered by a profusion of worlds than by a profusion of words. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
