On 2/22/2015 2:52 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Feb 22, 2015 at 3:17 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 2/22/2015 9:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Feb 2015, at 02:50, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/20/2015 8:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
QM + collapse is inconsistent (with a great variety of principle, like
computationalism, God does not play dice, no spooky actions, etc.).
Principles of Platonist faith.
You don't need any faith to disbelieve in the opportunity to invoke magical
thing
in the explanation.
It is up to those who make extraordinary claims to provide the evidences.
Computationalism is an extraordinary claim.
For it to be extraordinary, it would have to be beyond ordinary. However
computationalism isn't just ordinary but its the majority opinion among philosophers of
mind.
Not as Bruno uses it: That all computations exist Platonically and instantiate all
possible thoughts - and a lot of other stuff.
That some things may happen at random isn't.
If random events were so common, why has no scientist ever detected a conclusively
objectively random phenomenon?
How do you know that? Has any scientist ever detected anything "conclusively and
objectively". There are a lot of scientist who have studied the statistics to quantum
phenomena to see if they agree with the Born rule - and so far they do.
Why is every phenomenon among all theories in physics is deterministic
If they aren't we call them "geography" or "symmetry breaking".
(with the notable exception of wave-function collapse (which Everett showed can be
explained as a deterministic phenomenon without having to assume it as a separate
postulate/phenomenon beyond the deterministic, linear and reversible equations of QM))?
Except that you do have to assume a separate postulate. Either you assume the Born rule
assigns probabilities, or you must assume infinitely many parallel worlds and show somehow
that branch counting recovers the Born rule.
Brent
It is a theorem of comp, also. The many worlds, in his relative state
formulation, is already a consequence of computationalism. By church
thesis,
*all* computations are emulated in all possible ways in elementary
arithmetic,
with a typical machine-independent redundancy: it makes the notion of
"world"
formulable,
Does it? What's the definition of a world in comp?
It is a model of "my beliefs", assuming I am consistent (so that such a
model exist).
That would comport with quantum bayesianism.
You can handle the world by notion like maximal consistent sets of formula,
which
in this case can have oracle like answering W or M when opening a door
after a
self-duplication. A world can satisfy a belief like "I belief in PA and I am
currently located at Washington".
But those are just words. Does Washington have to exist in a world? Or
just
propositions containing "Washington". Without some referents every two
propositions
not of the form "X and not-X" will be consistent. "I'm in Washington." and
"I'm in
Moscow." are consistent unless we have a theory of existence in spacetime
and some
referents for "Washington" and "Moscow".
It looks like you prefer "many words" over "many worlds":
http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9709032
It is argued that since all the above-mentioned approaches to nonrelativistic quantum
mechanics give identical cookbook prescriptions for how to calculate things in practice,
practical-minded experimentalists, who have traditionally adopted the
``shut-up-and-calculate interpretation'', typically show little interest in whether cozy
classical concepts are in fact real in some untestable metaphysical sense or merely the
way we subjectively perceive a mathematically simpler world where the Schrodinger
equation describes everything - and that they are therefore becoming less bothered by a
profusion of worlds than by a profusion of words.
Jason
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