On 28 Feb 2015, at 00:06, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Feb 27, 2015 at 01:50:21PM -0500, John Clark wrote:
Yes, people very often, usually in fact, don't know with certainty
what the
future will bring. Bruno apparently believes he's the first to
notice that,
well he is the first to give that concept a pompous sounding
acronym. As I
said, philosophy around here is finding pretentious and long words to
describe well known but pedestrian ideas.
To be fair to Bruno, that is not what he claims. The FPI comes from
the fundamental uncertainty in know which person you are,
Yes, that is directly the global indeterminacy, like in step seven.
But it is more "which virtual body you have/will-have in the universal
dovetailing (or in the sigma_1 complete arithmetic).
The first person knows always who she is, even if she cannot gave a
name or a description.
and
generates genuine randomness within a completely deterministic
system. This is still a shocking result to many people.
But that is in the case of the iterated self-duplication.
But in front of the UD, obviously it can only be on computations which
married well with gaussian choice below the substitution level. If not
we have the white noise which blurs the physical stability. White
rabbits, perhaps Occam catastrophes.
Whether he is first or not is more debatable. Certainly, it seems
Everett did much the same thing with the MWI. Bruno's contribution is
to show the mechanism works within the setting of classical
computationalism via the universal dovetailer.
You can say that Everett uses it first, but miss that it works for
explaining matter, only if the SWE is extracted from the self-
referential variant restricted to the sigma_ 1 reality.
Everett was not working on the mind-body problem, and is not aware of
the universal turing machine and its löbian limitations.
He missed also that even in QM, the identity thesis is broken in one
direction. We can attach a mind to a computation, but a mind can
attach itself only to infinities of computations, in QM too! (Just
that the situation is worst in arithmetic, or a fortiori in any richer
"everything" ontology.
Best,
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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