On 28 Feb 2015, at 16:38, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Feb 27, 2015Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au> wrote:
> To be fair to Bruno, that is not what he claims. The FPI comes
from the fundamental uncertainty in know which person you are,
^^^
John Clark doesn't understand the question. Which person who is?
> it seems Everett did much the same thing with the MWI.
I disagree for 3 reasons:
1) Everett was trying to explain the strange observations of the
Quantum world in a logically cohesive way and to show why Quantum
Mechanics was able to make such good predictions about future
physical events. Everett said nothing about consciousness because he
didn't need to, and that is the HUGE advantage Many Worlds has over
other Quantum interpretations and is the only reason I'm a fan of
the MWI. In the other Quantum Interpretations consciousness soon
enters the picture, that would be OK if they could explain
consciousness but they can't. Everett can't explain consciousness
either but he doesn't need to because consciousness has nothing to
do with his theory.
On the contrary. Everett has to make a choice for a theory of mind,
and its suits him very well to define the first person by its memory
sequences, but then it needs to remated them through computations. The
problem is that those machines cannot distinguish the quantum
computational histories from all computations a priori, so Everett's
move must be push one step more, and the SWE has to be explained from
a computationalist theory of the first person person.
Guess what, incompleteness redeems the Theaetetus' definition. So we
can try. Which I did.
2) Like Everett Bruno is interested in predictions but unlike
Everett Bruno thinks that good predictions are the key to personal
identity, and that's just nuts.
That is indeed quite nuts.
Good prediction are the key of the theory of matter. Only.
I have explained a tun of time how the 3p notion of 1p and 3p makes
possible to avoid us to pronounce ourselves on personal identity.
You might confusing threads, as in some threads I like to discuss on
personal identity, but I void it in UDA and AUDA, except in separate
philosophical questioning non relevant to understand step 0 to Step 8,
and its translation in arithmetic.
The sense of self depends on the past not the future. You remember
being Russell Standish yesterday so you feel like Russell Standish
today, but if one of your predictions was false and things didn't
turn out as you expected (and I imagine that has actually happened
to you at some point in your life) you'd still feel like Russell
Standish, you'd just feel that you've made a mistake. Bruno has got
it backwards, he's trying to push on a string.
?
3) With Everett the meaning of the personal pronoun "you" is always
obvious, it is the only person that the laws of physics allow me to
observe that fits the description of Russell Standish, but in a
world with matter duplicating machines as in Bruno's thought
experiments there are 2 (or more) people who fit that description,
and so the word "you" is ambiguous and conveys zero information.
This is simply false, once you keep in mind the difference between the
1p and the 3p. Different people showed you that clearly.
Bruno says he wants to explain the nature of personal identity
Where did I ever say that? I want only explain what can be matter, in
case we assume our bodies are Turing emulable at some level.
I expose a problem.
Personal identity, for machine, is what I start from in AUDA. because
the 3p-self is defined by the second recursion theorem of Kleene in
very few steps, and the 1p-self, I explain machines recover it by the
Theaetetus' definition.
You have admit stopping the reading of sane04 at step 3, but you talsk
like if you have read ... I don't know what imaginary texts.
Quentin is right. This is lying.
but then without a second's pause acts as if the concept of personal
identity was already crystal clear even though in his thought
experiments such concepts are stretched about as far as they can go.
This is babbling, hand-waving.
In such circumstances to keep using personal pronouns with abandon
as Bruno does without giving them a second thought is just ridiculous.
So you have no idea if the delay introduced in step four change or not
the expectations in helsinki?
I think that at step 3, you stop thinking about the consequences of
your beliefs. You never completed the thought experiment.
You say that "you" is ambiguous, but I ask for a W or a M, and if you
repeat enough the duplication (iterated duplication), as Kim saw,
children understand the question, and the difference between the 1-you
and the 3-you
By definition, the first person experience is the content of the
diaries, and most are random, by simple combinatorics.
I have no clue why you behave like that.
Bruno
John K Clark
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
