On 29 Mar 2015, at 08:43, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 3/28/2015 12:33 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
You're saying the static written out calculation instantiates a bit
of consciousness? Does it matter in what language it is written or
whether anyone can read it? In some language it might just be a
single line, as Feynman joked, X=0. How does it get it's meaning?
It is the sequence of brain states that gives rise to consciousness
-- the calculations are relevant only for the simulation of this
sequence of states. That is how the calculations get their meaning.
It is only if you insist that your computing mechanism is
counterfactually correct that you can say that a recording
cannot reconstitute consciousness, but the computing mechanism
is not the calculation that corresponds to consciousness.
That agrees with Bruno's view that the mechanism is irrelevant, it
is the abstract computation, that exists in Platonia, that
corresponds to consciousness. Since all physics is simply inferred
from conscious experiences and thoughts then the material world
should be explained in terms of those abstract computations that
instantiate thoughts. He then goes onto to suppose that all
possible computations are done, in the abstract, by the Universal
Dovetailer running of the UTM in Platonia. Then the state his
problem is to show that the apparent order we observe and agreement
in perception can be recovered from within this potential
infinitude of computation.
Quite. I do not think that Russell's 'White Rabbit' arguments do
much in this direction. Bruno has to derive QM from the UD,
Assuming QM is correct (which is quite plausible, so OK)
And I derived the quantum logic already.
not just point to some chance similarities between FPI and the MWI.
No, those comparison are used only for those who believe that being
multiplied all the time is absurd.
Anyway, the point is that we have no choice: if comp is true then
physics *has* to be derived from machine or arithmetical self-
reference (that is from RA). That is the result. I just illustrate
then that indeed universal machine get quickly the quantum logic (with
some difference perhaps, but that remains to be seen).
Then, when interviewing tha universal (Löbian) machines, we get not
only physics, but also the non communicable part of physics.
I got perhaps only the shadow of the quanta, but I got also the shadow
of the quanta, and a conceptual frame where we can see the shape of
the solution of the mind-body problem (which was part of the goal).
In contrast, the more rigorous materialist/physicalist, like Dennett,
just eliminate consciousness as an illusion, which is pure nonsense to
me (and probably to anyone conscious).
Actually, he just needs to derive Newtonian physics, or even some
basic symmetries of spacetime.
Once the quantum logic is here, yes. And we got the symmetries, but
space-time is the hardest part.
The problem of miracles in the UD will not go away easily.
I am glad to hear that. personally, I still think this might lead to a
refutation of comp. Without Gödel and Everett, I would most probably
disbelieve in computationalism.
Bruno
Bruce
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