On 02 Apr 2015, at 00:29, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, Apr 01, 2015 at 01:50:51PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
OK, but so you agree that MGA shows that if comp is true, matter is
of no use, unless we admit that a complex experience like a human
dream can supervene on a very simple trivial activity. Then the MGA
intuition pump seems to work well enough, imo.
Bruno
You have just conceded my point. Then the MGA is not a logical proof
(as
you have sometimes claimed, and Quentin claimed even more forcefully),
but rather an argument by incredulity, or an intuition pump as Daniel
Dennett puts it. Nothing wrong with that of course, we just need to
know what has actually been achieved.
Not really, I have always taken for granted that we cannot prove
something about "reality", so it was clear for me that MGA use Occam,
and can only weaken the use of Occam, not that it proves something
about "reality". I agree that I should have expanded on this more in
the Lille thesis (the only point where I agree with Delahaye).
As a proof, MGA proves (informally) something like comp implies non
matter or movie can vehiculate any experience. Which is close to a
proof that comp implies no-matter to me. But you and Delahaye are
right, I should be clearer on this. Point well taken (but already
conceded a long time ago, it seems to me).
Bruno
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