Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Apr 02, 2015 at 07:07:09AM +0200, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
Which assumes perhaps too strong a form of functionalism and/or digitalism
that runs into its own contradiction with 1p consciousness?

As pointed out in earlier post: With that move, it is no longer relevant to
distinguish recording from person who has 1p experience, zombie question is
nonsense, no indexical property, there is correct substitution level, all
possible 1p consciousness of all persons supervenes on the recording
(everything digital) *or* none at all since recording has no CC and other
such funky consequences I can't recall. How is this avoided if everything
is one bland sauce of digital?

It is not at all obvious that counterfactual correctness (CC) is
required for a computation to be conscious. Bruno usually argues that
feature is a red herring. If it is, then non-CC recordings are not
conscious, and the MGA goes through in the small (non-robust) universe
case. But recordings can also be counterfactually correct in principle
(in the form of a huge lookup table, for example, in Searles's Chinese
Room), or in the form of a precise specification of the quantum wave
function, or of a finite chunk of the UD* trace. Modulo the no-cloning
theorem, or the Seth Lloyd limit which would prevent such a recording
existing in our current universe.

Why are the limitations due to the size and/or age of our present universe relevant if the computation is carried out in Platonia -- on a non-physical UTM?

If the computations are carried out on a real physical UTM then consciousness supervenes on the physical universe after all!

Bruce

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