On 09 Apr 2015, at 09:22, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Apr 2015, at 02:35, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Yes, I had misread how that works. But who wrote the programs it
executes? Who wrote the scheduler?
Let us say God.
But with computationalism, God needs only to create the natural
numbers, and addition, and multiplication.
With physicalism God needs to create a physical universe, the
psychological universe, the mathematics, the link between,
Rubbish. If the physical universe is primary, consciousness
supervenes on the physical
Then computationalism is false; or there is a flaw in the UDA. I am
quite open to the idea, but you have to show were precisely.
and the situation is no different than with comp, where you have to
explain the appearance of the physical.
But up to now, this works, even if it explains physics in the opposite
direction as it explains first the quantum weirdness, the the logic of
observable, the symmetry of the Hamiltoinian,etc.
If you have to appeal to God, then the origin of the physical
universe can be no problem for you.
Well, I use God in Plato sense: it means the truth we search.
Physicalism is way ahead on this comparison. Consciousness
supervenes on the physical brain as can be seen by the fact that
external modifications to the brain modify consciousness, and
conscious thoughts modify the brain. The evidence is overwhelming
here.
I don't see any. The MGA shows that the appeal to a primary universe
just cannot work, unless you believe in non-comp sort of magic.
Mathematics is developed as a response to distinct but similar
things in the physical universe. Again, the origin of mathematics
does not present any difficulty for physicalism. Neither does the
relationship between the physical and the mathematical.
You are quick here.
Find the flaw in the UDA. Your argument here seems to be an argument
by incredulity, but I gave the reasoning, decomposed in easy steps, so
you should be able to say where things get wrong.
Search for the MGA in the archive. May be use my last paper(*). I
don't find it right now, I think Kim gave a link, with some typo and
spelling corrected. The MGA is only referred to in the sane04 paper.
Bruno
(*) Bruno Marchal. The computationalist reformulation of the mind-body
problem, Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology, Volume 113,
Issue 1, September 2013, Pages 127–140
Bruce
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