On 5/8/2015 1:33 AM, LizR wrote:
On 8 May 2015 at 18:37, meekerdb <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:On 07 May 2015, at 14:45, Bruce Kellett wrote: We can use an original biological brain, or an equivalent digital replacement -- it does not make any significant difference to the argument. The first point is that in some conscious experience, be it a dream or anything else, there might be a portion of the 'brain' (in quotes because it can be biological or digital) that is not activated, so this can be removed without affecting the conscious experience. This idea of removing unused parts of brain so only "active" elements remain, seems problematic to me and not just because of counterfactual correctness. The ability to do this is implicit in the assumption that the physics of the brain is classical.But comp is based on the assumption that consciousness is the result of classical computation. If that assumption's wrong then comp fails, of course, from step 0 - no need to worry about the MGA.
Bruno points out that a classical computer can compute anything that a quantum computer can so it doesn't exactly fail; what I think it implies that the classical computation must include the "environemnt", i.e. all the extra physical degrees of freedom and entanglement that make the brain computation (approximately) classical.
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