On 9 May 2015 at 10:37, Russell Standish <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Fri, May 08, 2015 at 08:33:43PM +1200, LizR wrote: > > > > > > But comp is based on the assumption that consciousness is the result of > > classical computation. If that assumption's wrong then comp fails, of > > course, from step 0 - no need to worry about the MGA. > > > > But Brent's qualms are just that removing the inactive parts (thus > making the computation noncounterfactual, and potentially destroying > the comp supervenience) also actually change the physical quantum > state, so may also be destroying the physical supervenience. > But comp assumes classical computation... > > Hence invalidating the distinction between computational and physical > supervenience. > If the computation isn't classical, and can't be made classical, then comp fails at step 0 > > ISTM, the MGA works in a purely classical physical reality (such as > the non-robust case), but not a quantum one (which is a robust > case). This is not a problem for Bruno's argument, but it must be > clear that the MGA is _only_ relevant for the non-robust case. > > It's relevant for a robust classical case, which is presumably what is supposed to take place (or exist timelessly) in Platonia. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
