On 9 May 2015 at 11:24, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > On 5/8/2015 2:58 PM, LizR wrote: > > On 9 May 2015 at 09:02, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > >> On 5/8/2015 1:33 AM, LizR wrote: >> >> On 8 May 2015 at 18:37, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >> >>> On 07 May 2015, at 14:45, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> We can use an original biological brain, or an equivalent digital >>>>> replacement -- it does not make any significant difference to the >>>>> argument. >>>>> The first point is that in some conscious experience, be it a dream or >>>>> anything else, there might be a portion of the 'brain' (in quotes because >>>>> it can be biological or digital) that is not activated, so this can be >>>>> removed without affecting the conscious experience. >>>>> >>>> >>> This idea of removing unused parts of brain so only "active" elements >>> remain, seems problematic to me and not just because of counterfactual >>> correctness. The ability to do this is implicit in the assumption that the >>> physics of the brain is classical. >> >> >> But comp is based on the assumption that consciousness is the result of >> classical computation. If that assumption's wrong then comp fails, of >> course, from step 0 - no need to worry about the MGA. >> >> Bruno points out that a classical computer can compute anything that a >> quantum computer can so it doesn't exactly fail; what I think it implies >> that the classical computation must include the "environemnt", i.e. all the >> extra physical degrees of freedom and entanglement that make the brain >> computation (approximately) classical. >> > > That sounds like putting the cart before the horse. The question is, can > the brain and environment be extracted from the assumption that > consciousness is classical computation? Which is, of course, still an open > question. > > True, it's a problem from either end. If you just assume computation is > fundamental then you have to get QM out of it and ALSO the approximate > classicality of the physically realized computation. >
Exactly. That is Bruno's problem. > Plus, assuming no quantum entanglement with the environment is involved > in consciousness (as seems likely given the decoherence times of neurons > etc) > > That's not taking the QM seriously. QM says that it's the decoherence > due to entanglement with the environment that produces the classical > behavior. > OK, I think even with a little brain I'm beginning to see the point here. I'm not yet sure if it's relevant, however. I think Max Tegmark's point was that the environment of a neuron is other neurons (and the surrounding material - glia, blood, etc) and that everything in a brain is decohering far faster than than the timescales of consciousness. Why would taking the QM seriously prevent the brain behaving as a classical computer on those timescales? Or to move the question into a (perhaps) better known realm, why would it stop a computer running an AI programme behaving as a classical computer? If the brain is fundamentally different to an AI due to quantum effects, that invalidates comp at step 0 (and possibly invalidates strong AI as well). -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
