On the subject of modifying the recording, let's say we recorded the states of all the brain cells and so on. This would mean that the signals coming in from the senses were encoded in the recording. If we assume the experience was of looking at a red dot, it might be fairly easy to replace the red dot nerve signals with green dot ones. But then you have to change the memories to be of the relevant colour, and any thoughts to reflect that fact...
And this is from looking at a dot. Hmm. On 9 May 2015 at 14:59, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: > On 9 May 2015 at 10:37, Russell Standish <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On Fri, May 08, 2015 at 08:33:43PM +1200, LizR wrote: >> > >> > >> > But comp is based on the assumption that consciousness is the result of >> > classical computation. If that assumption's wrong then comp fails, of >> > course, from step 0 - no need to worry about the MGA. >> > >> >> But Brent's qualms are just that removing the inactive parts (thus >> making the computation noncounterfactual, and potentially destroying >> the comp supervenience) also actually change the physical quantum >> state, so may also be destroying the physical supervenience. >> > > But comp assumes classical computation... > >> >> Hence invalidating the distinction between computational and physical >> supervenience. >> > > If the computation isn't classical, and can't be made classical, then comp > fails at step 0 > >> >> ISTM, the MGA works in a purely classical physical reality (such as >> the non-robust case), but not a quantum one (which is a robust >> case). This is not a problem for Bruno's argument, but it must be >> clear that the MGA is _only_ relevant for the non-robust case. >> >> It's relevant for a robust classical case, which is presumably what is > supposed to take place (or exist timelessly) in Platonia. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
