On 12 May 2015, at 01:41, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, May 11, 2015 at 07:23:10PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 May 2015, at 07:09, Jason Resch wrote:
Perhaps one way of looking at it that makes it more intuitive is
that a mirror implements a recording and playback aparatus. The
farther away it is, the more delayed the playback. But few would
attribute consciousness to their reflection.
Nice point.
Bruno
A not particularly relevant point, I would think. A reflection such as
that Jason described is not a faithful recording of brain processes. I
don't believe anybody is proposing that the flickering image of
Humphrey Bogart in CasaBlanca is conscious.
Again - the sorts of recordings being discussed are something like an
EEG recording of every neuron in a brain. I still don't think our
intuition can cope with that. The recording needs to be sufficiently
faithful to the original such that playback is physically
indistinguishable from the original process. And need I mention the Z
word at this point.
The point is that the image of the movie in the mirror is as much
faithful to the boolean circuit than the movie. If the movie is end to
both W and M, but that in M it is played in front of a mirror; would
you say that P(M) = 2/3 and P(W) = 1/3?
Then the diameter of the neuron would play a role in the measure, or
the number of identical procesing, which is already absurd. Of course,
as other said also, the measure relies only on the possibility of the
manifestation of consciousness, and there are none in a movie.
Consciousness requires computations, which requires the
counterfactuals (and that is different of the actualization of the
"parallel histories".
Bruno
PS Lot of works, I will comment some posts at the pause-café, from
time to time.
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Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected]
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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