On Wednesday, May 13, 2015, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote:
> meekerdb wrote: > >> On 5/12/2015 4:26 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: >> >>> meekerdb wrote: >>> >>>> On 5/11/2015 11:14 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>>> [BM] Why? Have you proven that consciousness supervenes on a record? >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Have you proven that it does not? >>>>> >>>> >>>> No, but I have a lot of evidence it supervenes on brain /*processes*/. >>>> Reducing that to /*states*/ is a further assumption. >>>> >>> >>> That is the pedant's reply. :-) >>> A process reduces to a sequence of states -- you simply lower the >>> substitution level (step rate) to whatever value is necessary to reproduce >>> the process FAPP. >>> >> >> No, a sequence of states is not the same as a process. In a process the >> states in the sequence are causally related. >> > > Need I quote Hume at you, Brent? That which we know as causality is > nothing more than the constant conjunction of events. You make 'causality' > into a sort of dualist magic. > > > In playing back a *digitized* recording of states the causal relation is >> broken. But, as I pointed out to Bruno, "causal" is a nomological, not >> logical, relation. He, of course, disagreed. >> >> >>> The assumption of the argument was that consciousness supervenes on the >>>>> brain state. >>>>> >>>> >>>> That's not the same as saying yes to the doctor. It's your added >>>> interpretation that consciousness supervenes on a brain state as opposed to >>>> a brain process that constitutes a computation. Bruno, who made the >>>> argument, I think is relying on the latter. >>>> >>> >>> Yes, that seems to be the case. The original claim of absurdity for the >>> idea that consciousness could supervene on a recording has been replaced by >>> the claim that the recording is not a computation of the required kind. >>> This also begs the question of course -- where is it proved that that >>> particular type of computation is both necessary and sufficient for >>> consciousness? >>> >> >> It's just hypothesized as implicit in saying yes to the doctor; one would >> only say yes if it were a counterfactually correct AI. >> >> >>> However, I think one can approach this in a different way. The >>> overwhelming evidence from neuroscience, and all related experimentation, >>> is that consciousness supervenes on the physical brain -- the goo in our >>> skulls. Damage the goo, stimulate the goo, do anything to the goo, and our >>> qualia or consciousness are altered. Alter our >>> consciousness/thinking/processing and there are associated changes in the >>> brain activity/states. (Pet scans and the like.) >>> >>> The MGA argues that the natural sequence of brain states and a recording >>> of that sequence are not equivalent in that one is conscious and the other >>> is not. It is concluded from this that consciousness does not supervene on >>> the brain states/processes, which conclusion is contradicted by the >>> overwhelming bulk of experimental evidence. >>> >> >> I agree with you and Russell that it is not obvious that consciousness >> can't supervene on a playback of a recording. But, I don't think there's >> any empirical evidence regarding recordings of brains. In fact one of >> Russell's points is that the fact that such a recording would be so large >> and detailed is a reason not to trust intuitions about whether it could be >> conscious. >> > > C'mon, Brent. It's a thought experiment. The fact that we don't have > experimental evidence of conscious recordings is irrelevant to this > particular thought experiment. > > > This is science. When your theory is contradicted by overwhelming >>> experimental evidence, it is conventionally taken as evidence that your >>> theory has been falsified. The MGA puts Bruno's theory in this category: it >>> has been falsified by the experimental results. >>> >> >> Would that it were so. But so far as I can see Bruno's theory doesn't >> make any definite predictions that can be empirically tested. It explains >> a few things: quantum randomness=FPI and you can't know what program you >> are. But these things also have other possible explanations and they were >> already known. >> > > Bruno does make a prediction that can be empirically tested. He predicts > that consciousness does not supervene on physical brains but on > computations. The MGA purports to show that the assumption of physical > supervenience leads to a contradiction. But supervenience of consciousness > on brains is an indisputable empirical result, so the MGA works against > comp. > Not necessarily. Simulated beings could be conscious with their simulated brains. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
