On 14 May 2015, at 08:08, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 May 2015, at 14:08, Bruce Kellett wrote:
So you claim that there is a contradiction between physical
supervenience and comp.
Yes. Between primitive-physical supervenience (as this what is at
stake).
I cannot allow that this move is legitimate. The MGA does not at any
point refer to the basic ontology,
Read my paper and long texts. I talk only on that. I search the
simplest ontology (realm) to explain both matter and mind, and in a
way which makes possible to formulate mathematically the mind-body
problem (that is: the body appearance problem in sigma_1 arithmetic)
Why taking all the time this negative outlook. I am not criticizing
physics, only the statement that physics is the fundamental science
(physicalism). You need to grasp why.
nor does it at any point make a distinction between what is true for
a matter ontology as opposed to a Platonic ontology. The argument
works in exactly the same way for both, so if you dismiss a physical
ontology on the basis of this argument, you must, in logic, also
dismiss the arithmetical ontology.
Where is the flaw? I answered your question.
Comp is either false, or it is incoherent.
I guess you mean comp2.
But where is the flaw in comp1 -> comp2 argument?
Your previous argument were based on a misunderstanding of what are
computations. It seemed to me.
Just try to ask question where you don't understand. You made often
correct point, but non relevant for invalidating the argument.
Bruno
Bruce
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