On 13 May 2015, at 14:08, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 May 2015, at 06:28, Russell Standish wrote:
In which case their consciousness supervenes on their simulated
physics.
Simulated beings could be conscious with their simulated brains in
arithmetic.
This is still physical supervenience,
yes, even when the brains are simulated in arithmetic, as to get
the right measure, that simulation will have to have the right
relative measure.
of the sort Bruce was
talking about.
I think he was using primitive-physical supervenience.
I think this is where you misunderstand me, Bruno. You are ascribing
to me a particular metaphysical position to which I do not
necessarily subscribe.
Apology if I did.
As has been said a few times, the basic ontology of physics is
whatever our best physical theories tell us it is. This is not
generally "primitive matter", whatever that is.
Primitive matter, is, by definition whatever physical you assume in
the fundamental theory. For example the standard model (in physics)
assumes some particles, having relation, through some other particles.
But you can do physics without assuming the metaphysical assumpitions
that those particles are real, and if that there are not fundamenal,
they are made of physical things, that we still need to assume.
I don't want to classify diverse degree of naivety in the concept of
primitive matter, and we can saty at the level of the assumption
needed. It also assumes a fundamental physical reality at the ground
of all other realities (chemical, biological, psychological,
sociological, etc.).
In my criticism of the MGA, I am not committed to any particular
ontology. I am simply pointing to the fact that the physical world
exists independently of you or me, just as 2+2=4 exists
independently of you or me.
But this is ambiguous. If you use "physical world" in the aristotelian
sense, I have no evidence that it is true. If you define the physical
by the (stable) appearance to us, then you already slip on self-
reference, and the Platonic idea that we might dream that physical
reality. It is less demanding in assumption, given that those dreams
exist in virtue of the minimal amount of math we need to talk about
the physical reality.
if not you beg the question.
Our physical brains are part of this physical world, whether the
basic ontology be quarks and electrons, quantum fields, or
computations in Platonia. And our consciousness supervenes on these
physical brains, however constituted -- the overwhelming weight of
neurophysiological and other scientific evidence shows this.
Yes. Comp starts from this constatation.
But we just beg the qeustion of how the physical world, whatver it is,
succeed in selecting this or that comp histoiry in arithmetic.
Solution: we take them all. And do the math to see if that works, and
the thing is that it works, even if modestly.
As published, the MGA shows that *any* physical supervenience
entails that replacing the brain by a recording of its activity will
recreate the original conscious state.
In "real time", yes.
This is claimed to be absurd, since a recording does not consist of
a computation of the kind required by comp,
Well, required by the guy who was hoping to survive.
which says that a recording cannot be conscious.
Then all real numbers are conscious, you go out completely from
computer science. Your TOE is just the counting algorithm, and you can
predict nothing.
You dismiss that we say yes to the dorcor, because the artificial
brain will do the right computation, which means by defifnition, be
counterfactually correct.
So you claim that there is a contradiction between physical
supervenience and comp.
Yes. Between primitive-physical supervenience (as this what is at
stake).
But the physical brain on which consciousness supervenes might well
be itself a product of comp (and is, if you take the robust UD
seriously).
With the FPI, yes.
So you have shown that, either your whole theory is internally
inconsistent, or else you have to abandon the supervenience of
consciousness on brain goo, in contradiction to the empirical
evidence.
Not with empirical evidence, just with the usual identity mind-brain,
which is doubted since long, and is related to a difficult problem
since the antic time.
If you allow that the recording can be conscious, then the MGA is
toothless -- is does not accomplish anything. But in allowing a
recording to be conscious, you have contradicted what I take to be
one of your basic tenets of comp.
So comp is either false or it is incoherent.
Lol
Well tried :)
I think that if you understand what is a computation, in the Turing-
Church sense, you can't believe that the movie is a computation,
except in ad hoc a posteriori sense in which everything can compute
everything.
But then I have to retract that consciousness requires the physical
computation, even if the physical computation will still explains the
right measure. But then it means that the physical measure is the cop
measure, or at least, we can do the math and compared. And it works,
amazingly enough. I thought for long this would be proved way too much
naive, in which case we might improve the approachs, but well, on the
tractable quantum and non quantum proposition it fits. To see this,
you need to study papers by Goldblattt (on modal approach to quantum
logic), Solovay (on the modal logic of self-reference, Theaetetus, on
knowledge),
I offer tools for refuting comp, but instead of contradiction, we get
the quantum weirdness. Informally and formally.
Bruno
Bruce
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