Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 May 2015, at 06:28, Russell Standish wrote:
In which case their consciousness supervenes on their simulated
physics.
Simulated beings could be conscious with their simulated brains in
arithmetic.
This is still physical supervenience,
yes, even when the brains are simulated in arithmetic, as to get the
right measure, that simulation will have to have the right relative
measure.
of the sort Bruce was
talking about.
I think he was using primitive-physical supervenience.
I think this is where you misunderstand me, Bruno. You are ascribing to
me a particular metaphysical position to which I do not necessarily
subscribe. As has been said a few times, the basic ontology of physics
is whatever our best physical theories tell us it is. This is not
generally "primitive matter", whatever that is.
In my criticism of the MGA, I am not committed to any particular
ontology. I am simply pointing to the fact that the physical world
exists independently of you or me, just as 2+2=4 exists independently of
you or me. Our physical brains are part of this physical world, whether
the basic ontology be quarks and electrons, quantum fields, or
computations in Platonia. And our consciousness supervenes on these
physical brains, however constituted -- the overwhelming weight of
neurophysiological and other scientific evidence shows this.
As published, the MGA shows that *any* physical supervenience entails
that replacing the brain by a recording of its activity will recreate
the original conscious state. This is claimed to be absurd, since a
recording does not consist of a computation of the kind required by
comp, which says that a recording cannot be conscious. So you claim that
there is a contradiction between physical supervenience and comp.
But the physical brain on which consciousness supervenes might well be
itself a product of comp (and is, if you take the robust UD seriously).
So you have shown that, either your whole theory is internally
inconsistent, or else you have to abandon the supervenience of
consciousness on brain goo, in contradiction to the empirical evidence.
If you allow that the recording can be conscious, then the MGA is
toothless -- is does not accomplish anything. But in allowing a
recording to be conscious, you have contradicted what I take to be one
of your basic tenets of comp.
So comp is either false or it is incoherent.
Bruce
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