On 13 May 2015 at 13:08, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
But the physical brain on which consciousness supervenes might well be > itself a product of comp (and is, if you take the robust UD seriously). So > you have shown that, either your whole theory is internally inconsistent, > or else you have to abandon the supervenience of consciousness on brain > goo, in contradiction to the empirical evidence. The observed co-variance of physical brain activity and conscious experience, assuming comp, would presumably be the net result of FPI over the entire spectrum of computation underlying both (or else comp is false). If this were indeed the case, I don't see why we would expect consciousness to survive the kind of disruption described in the MGA, despite the preservation of gross physical outcomes on a one-time basis. IOW, the device, after disruption and intervention, has merely degenerated to a one-time simulacrum, the consciousness of the original having depended on *computational* characteristics no longer capable of physical realisation. This doesn't strike me as being particularly counter-intuitive. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
