Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 May 2015, at 14:08, Bruce Kellett wrote:
So you claim that there is a contradiction between physical
supervenience and comp.
Yes. Between primitive-physical supervenience (as this what is at stake).
I cannot allow that this move is legitimate. The MGA does not at any
point refer to the basic ontology, nor does it at any point make a
distinction between what is true for a matter ontology as opposed to a
Platonic ontology. The argument works in exactly the same way for both,
so if you dismiss a physical ontology on the basis of this argument, you
must, in logic, also dismiss the arithmetical ontology.
Comp is either false, or it is incoherent.
Bruce
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