On Sat, May 16, 2015 at 11:50 AM, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]>
wrote:

> Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>> On Sat, May 16, 2015 at 10:22 AM, Bruce Kellett <
>> [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>>
>>     Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>
>>         On Sat, May 16, 2015 at 8:14 AM, Bruce Kellett
>>         <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
>>         <mailto:[email protected]
>>
>>         <mailto:[email protected]>>> wrote:
>>
>>             meekerdb wrote:
>>
>>                 On 5/15/2015 10:29 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>>
>>                     The AI that I envisage will probably be based on a
>>         learning
>>                     program of some sort, that will have to learn in
>>         much the
>>                     same way as an infant human learns. I doubt that we
>> will
>>                     ever be able to create an AI that is essentially an
>>                     intelligent adult human when it is first turned on.
>>
>>
>>                 I agree with that, but once an AI is realized it will be
>>                 possible to copy it.  And if it's digital it will be
>>         possible to
>>                 implement it using different hardware.  If it's not
>>         digital, it
>>                 will (in principle) be able to implement it arbitrarily
>>         closely
>>                 with a digital device.  And we will have the same
>> question -
>>                 what is that makes that hardware device conscious?  I
>>         don't see
>>                 any plausible answer except "Running the program it
>>         instantiates."
>>
>>
>>             But that does not imply that consciousness is itself a
>>         computation.
>>             There is not some subroutine in your AI the is labelled "this
>>             subroutine computes consciousness". Consciousness is a
>>         function of
>>             the whole functioning system, not of some particular
>>         feature. That
>>             is why I think identifying consciousness with computation is
>>         in fact
>>             adding some additional magic to the machine.
>>
>>
>>         So you don't believe that performing the same computations that
>>         your brain does in another substrate will produce a copy of your
>>         mind? If you don't believe that, then you must believe in some
>>         unknown property of matter (magic?). If you do, then you believe
>>         that consciousness supervenes on computation.      Consciousness
>>         arose in nature by a process of natural evolution.
>>
>>         How do you know that?
>>              Proto-consciousness gave some evolutionary advantage, so it
>>         grew and
>>             developed.
>>
>>         How do you know that?
>>              Nature did not at some point add the fact that it was a
>>         computation,
>>             and then it suddenly become conscious.
>>         Of course not. Nobody claims that.
>>              Consciousness is a computation only in the trivial sense
>>         that any
>>             physical process can be regarded as a computation, or
>>         mapping taking
>>             some input to some output. There is not some special,
>>         magical class
>>             of computations that are unique to consciousness.
>>         Consciousness is
>>             an evolved bulk property, not just one specific feature of
>>         that bulk.
>>
>>         How do you know it's evolved?
>>
>>
>>     Are you seriously going to argue that homo sapiens did *not* arise
>>     by a process of natural selection, aka evolution?
>>
>>
>> No, Darwinian evolution is my favourite scientific theory.
>>
>> What I am arguing is that we don't know if consciousness is an evolved
>> trait. It is perfectly possible to imagine darwinian evolution working
>> without consciousness, even to the human intelligence level (producing
>> philosophical zombies).
>>
>> For example, if consciousness is more fundamental than matter, then
>> evolution is something that happens within consciousness, not a generator
>> of it.
>>
>
> That is probably the strongest argument against computationalism to date.


How so?

Telmo.


>
>
> Bruce
>
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