On 28 Jun 2015, at 20:41, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/28/2015 7:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 28 Jun 2015, at 09:45, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruce Kellett wrote:
But the alternative does not establish the required result
either. If the brain ceases to be conscious as the connections
are removed -- either gradually or with the loss of some critical
number of connections -- then the hypothesis of physical
supervenience is substantiated.
As much as computationalism.
If it remains conscious (even though simply replaying a previous
conscious experience) even when only the recording playback
remains, then physical supervenience is still substantiated,
Making the physical supervenience thesis ridiculous, given that the
recording does no more compute anything related to the original
experience. This is why we have to abandon physical supervenience
thesis: consciousness is in the abstract computations, not in any
of its particular implementation (but then we will need to take all
of them below the substitution level, and thus get an interesting
problem, partially solved.
That's just asserting what you are supposed to argue. I agree that
the problem with regarding the recording as conscious is that the
playback is not related to its environment.
?
The boolean graph is also not related to the environment, as this ease
the reasoning (that is why I use a dream experience). But it is
irrelevant. If the interaction with the environment is needed for the
actual consciousness, then it is part of the (generalized) brain, on
which we apply the same reasoning (or you put non-Turing emulable
elements in the generalized brain, and comp is false.
But it could be: if the "recording" recorded a sufficiently large
chunk of causally related spacetime, then within that recordings
playback there would be relations between (recorded) thoughts and
(recorded) events so as to instantiate consciousness.
This does not make sense, as we (me, Maudlin) have showed that we can
change arbitrarily the physical activity related to the computation. I
use a recording because it is directly obvious that it does not
compute anything relevant for the original computations. See the
second unclothing of the movie (with hole in the pellicle) or the
"stroboscop" argument.
The same applies to the artificial brain. Simply "running" the
brain without relation to its environment (the body and external
physics) would be as sterile just playing back a recording.
That follows if we keep the physical supervenience thesis, but we have
just dropped it.
It's not only computation that is needed, it's computation that has
a shared environmental context.
Only to be able to manifest ourself relatively to each other. But that
cannot play a role in consciousness, or you give to neurons the
magical ability to perceive or not the existence of that sharable
environment.
And that context is supplied by the physical world - whether it's
primary or not.
That *is* correct, and indeed a theorem in comp. But now the point is
that the physical can no more be primary (with Occam we deliberately
drop the magic needed to add in comp to preserve primariness of
physics).
Bruno
Brent
because the recording is every bit as physical as the original
brain connections. In the "Yes, Doctor" argument, you are
agreeing to have your brain replaced by an emulation on a
physical computer.
For the sake of the reasoning, yes.
I doubt that even you would agree for the doctor to remove your
brain and replace it with a universal number tattooed
on your forehead.
You might need to study how we program a computer. Tattooing the
code on their front-head might not been enough, indeed.
Then, for finishing step 8, remind yourself that "universal
numbers", "emulation" are arithmetical relation.
Even, if, technically the heroin is
0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
+ the infinity of axioms: (F(0) & Ax(F(x) -> F(s(x))) -> AxF(x)
I never need to assume more, and in some sense, I don't assume more
than:
0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
I hope you agree with them, for the natural numbers. The fact that
it is a TOE is not obvious, but it follows from UDA. And AUDA shows
how to use it to test it with physics.
We can test machine's classical theology through its physical branch.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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