Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Jun 2015, at 08:27, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
It is step 5 which refutes definitely the closest continuer theory in
the computationalist frame.
The conclusions you wish to draw from step 5 might be incompatible
with the closest continuer account of personal identity. But that does
not refute the closest continuer theory --
OK.
it could equally be taken to refute comp.
If comp was under discussion. If you want put comp under discussion, I
am OK, although it is not part of my job.
What are we doing if not discussing comp?
My job was just to show that comp entails immaterialism,
And in that you have failed. MGA does not do it. In fact, nothing does
it, because nothing that you have ever mentioned requires the prior
assumption of primitive materialism.
and a measure
problem (say), and in the math part I show the propositional logics of
the points of view, and the shadow of the measure we are searching (that
is the arithmetical quantization which appears on the UD-arithmetic with
the "material points of view" []p & p, []p & <>t, []p & <>t & p, p
sigma_1).
And that is singularly uninteresting, because it does not even come
close to relating to the real world.
The scientific approach would be to discuss whether the memory-only
account of personal identity better accounts for the real-world data
than the closest continuer theory.
I can argue that comp, and only comp today, fits the known (quantum)
facts.
You have explained no quantum facts. All you have produced is a cat =
dog argument. Viz, you take a superficial resemblance between two things
and then claim an identity. This is not impressive.
It suggests a simple explanation (the many dreams already in
arithmetic, and the quantization which appears exactly where they should).
Non computationalist theoreticians should at least suggest what is not
computational in the brain or in the body, and propose a
non-computational theory of mind. But in my opinion, this is premature
and is usually proposed by people having the 19th century (pre-Gödelian)
conception of machine.
You are the one that has claimed that the physical world is not
computable. My contention is that the body (and the rest of the world)
is essential for a satisfactory account of personal identity. If you say
that this means that the person is not computable, then I am quite happy
to go along with this.
The closest continuer account easily wins that battle.
You are quite quick here.
What does it predicts for symmetrical duplication, like in step 3?
Read Nozick, or many of my recent posts. In the duplication case with
ties, the theory predicts the formation of two new independent persons.
And what is the non computational element in the mind. Don't say the
"soul", as with comp, the soul exists and can be justified to be non
computational from its own point of view.
See above.
Frankly, with comp we do have a rich theology, which include physics, so
it is normal to dig on the consequences and see if comp fits the data.
That is what I have been doing. And yet you say that comp is not under
discussion because that is not part of your job. You can't even be
consistent in what we are talking about.
But, obviously, you can also give us a non comp theory of mind, and do
the same. No problem. yet, I remember that you told us that you don't
have such a theory. So why being negative on the only theory which
exists, and is believed more or less implicitly by most?
I said that I do not have a detailed physical account of the workings of
the mind, because I am a physicist, not a neurologist. But a broad
theory of mind is easily obtained. Mind (and consciousness) supervene on
the physical brain, and are the product of the normal processes of
Darwinian evolution. There is absolutely no mystery here.
Comp is not the only theory that exists. And even if it were, that does
not mean that it is correct, or that it cannot be legitimately
criticized. You are far too defensive of your theory, and show yourself
completely closed even to discussion of the theory, and much more closed
to critical evaluation of the theory.
Bruce
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