On 29 Jun 2015, at 01:48, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 28 Jun 2015, at 09:45, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruce Kellett wrote:
But the alternative does not establish the required result
either. If the brain ceases to be conscious as the connections
are removed -- either gradually or with the loss of some critical
number of connections -- then the hypothesis of physical
supervenience is substantiated.
As much as computationalism.
Nothing to do with computationalism at this stage.
If you say that a brain change entails a consciousness change, you
argue at this stage as much for comp than for a materialist version
comp, which later has to be abandoned if there is no flaw in the
reasoning.
Biology and neurophysiology are the main reason why most people
believe in mechanism at the start, including the materialists.
If it remains conscious (even though simply replaying a previous
conscious experience) even when only the recording playback
remains, then physical supervenience is still substantiated,
Making the physical supervenience thesis ridiculous, given that the
recording does no more compute anything related to the original
experience.
This is merely an assertion, at best an argument from incredulity,
it is not a proof.
All "proof" about reality are argument from incredulity. We tend to
believe that the Earth is round, because the theory that the Earth is
flat has become incredible with the current data and current theories.
If you believe that consciousness, of the same original experience
related to the boolean graph, exists in real time when the recording
is produced, tell me if the same experience occurs with a hole in the
pellicle.
This is why we have to abandon physical supervenience thesis:
consciousness is in the abstract computations, not in any of its
particular implementation (but then we will need to take all of
them below the substitution level, and thus get an interesting
problem, partially solved.
But you haven't abandoned the physical supervenience thesis, because
you will not allow me to remove your brain entirely, leaving you to
subsist purely on arithmetic.
To talk with you, I still need my physical brain, like I need a
reasonable internet connection.
But this is local, and at the fundamental level, it is the apparent
brains (and atoms, ...) which emerges from all computations in
arithmetic. It is like the collapse in the MWI. we don't need no more
to assume it, because we can explain the phenomenological account with
a mechanist theory of mind. Likewise, we abandon the physical
supervenience thesis, and explain the *appearance* of a local
supervenience thesis by the mathematics of the comp global FPI.
As long as the physical brain, whether of primary or emergent
physicalism, has any role at all, you have not established
computationalism or eliminated materialism.
Correct. I eliminate only the conjunction of computationalism and
materialism (and the usual weak Occam).
because the recording is every bit as physical as the original
brain connections. In the "Yes, Doctor" argument, you are
agreeing to have your brain replaced by an emulation on a
physical computer.
For the sake of the reasoning, yes.
So accept the reasoning, then scrape your brain out of your skull.
Accept the premise of the reasoning, then try to understand the
reasoning.
I doubt that even you would agree for the doctor to remove your
brain and replace it with a universal number tattooed on your
forehead.
You might need to study how we program a computer. Tattooing the
code on their front-head might not been enough, indeed.
So the program is not enough. It must be run on some physical device?
No, it must be run by a universal number, physical or not.
This is JC's point,
Give the link. It seems to me that JC point is again step 3, but you
might allude to another post I forget.
and you have not ever answered it satisfactorily.
Ah! You allude to the point that the notion of running in program is
an arithmetical notion?
I did propose to you, and other, an explanation, but, even if it is
elementary computer science, it *is* technical, and you decline my
suggestion to explain, or that you study some textbook.
Concerning precisely that question, the fact that RA represents
already all computations, the best explanation are in Epstein &
Carnielli or Boolos and Jeffery (and Burgess, for the last edition).
Once you understand how function a computer, it is not so hard to
understand, and the basic ideas are already in Gödel 1931 paper (and
the thousand papers which exploit that technic).
I intent to explain that again, but as some told me once, people run
away when they see math formula, which is hard to avoid. The key is in
the distinction between a reality (like 2) and a description of it
(like "2").
To do that, you would have to ask the doctor to replace your brain
with a non-material program or some universal numbers.
That just make no sense. What happens is that the notion of
materiality is indexical (indeed eventually defined by []p & p(<>t) (&
p), with p sigma_1).
It is like in a video game, if you don't have the right sword at the
right time, the dragon will eat you. Knowing the code of the sword, or
having it in your pocket will not help, despite the original sword is
not material, it still need the relevant implementation in the most
probable universal number which is running you. An arithmetical
typhoon can make you wet only relatively to the universal numbers
running you in front of the typhoon.
Bruno
Bruce
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