On 25 Jun 2015, at 08:27, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
It is step 5 which refutes definitely the closest continuer theory
in the computationalist frame.
The conclusions you wish to draw from step 5 might be incompatible
with the closest continuer account of personal identity. But that
does not refute the closest continuer theory --
OK.
it could equally be taken to refute comp.
If comp was under discussion. If you want put comp under discussion, I
am OK, although it is not part of my job.
My job was just to show that comp entails immaterialism, and a measure
problem (say), and in the math part I show the propositional logics of
the points of view, and the shadow of the measure we are searching
(that is the arithmetical quantization which appears on the UD-
arithmetic with the "material points of view" []p & p, []p & <>t, []p
& <>t & p, p sigma_1).
The scientific approach would be to discuss whether the memory-only
account of personal identity better accounts for the real-world data
than the closest continuer theory.
I can argue that comp, and only comp today, fits the known (quantum)
facts. It suggests a simple explanation (the many dreams already in
arithmetic, and the quantization which appears exactly where they
should).
Non computationalist theoreticians should at least suggest what is not
computational in the brain or in the body, and propose a non-
computational theory of mind. But in my opinion, this is premature and
is usually proposed by people having the 19th century (pre-Gödelian)
conception of machine.
The closest continuer account easily wins that battle.
You are quite quick here.
What does it predicts for symmetrical duplication, like in step 3?
And what is the non computational element in the mind. Don't say the
"soul", as with comp, the soul exists and can be justified to be non
computational from its own point of view.
Frankly, with comp we do have a rich theology, which include physics,
so it is normal to dig on the consequences and see if comp fits the
data.
But, obviously, you can also give us a non comp theory of mind, and do
the same. No problem. yet, I remember that you told us that you don't
have such a theory. So why being negative on the only theory which
exists, and is believed more or less implicitly by most?
Bruno
Bruce
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