On 6/28/2015 7:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 28 Jun 2015, at 09:45, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruce Kellett wrote:
But the alternative does not establish the required result either. If the brain ceases
to be conscious as the connections are removed -- either gradually or with the loss of
some critical number of connections -- then the hypothesis of physical supervenience
is substantiated.
As much as computationalism.
If it remains conscious (even though simply replaying a previous conscious experience)
even when only the recording playback remains, then physical supervenience is still
substantiated,
Making the physical supervenience thesis ridiculous, given that the recording does no
more compute anything related to the original experience. This is why we have to abandon
physical supervenience thesis: consciousness is in the abstract computations, not in any
of its particular implementation (but then we will need to take all of them below the
substitution level, and thus get an interesting problem, partially solved.
That's just asserting what you are supposed to argue. I agree that the problem with
regarding the recording as conscious is that the playback is not related to its
environment. But it could be: if the "recording" recorded a sufficiently large chunk of
causally related spacetime, then within that recordings playback there would be relations
between (recorded) thoughts and (recorded) events so as to instantiate consciousness. The
same applies to the artificial brain. Simply "running" the brain without relation to its
environment (the body and external physics) would be as sterile just playing back a
recording. It's not only computation that is needed, it's computation that has a shared
environmental context. And that context is supplied by the physical world - whether it's
primary or not.
Brent
because the recording is every bit as physical as the original brain connections. In
the "Yes, Doctor" argument, you are agreeing to have your brain replaced by an
emulation on a physical computer.
For the sake of the reasoning, yes.
I doubt that even you would agree for the doctor to remove your brain and replace it
with a universal number tattooed
on your forehead.
You might need to study how we program a computer. Tattooing the code on their
front-head might not been enough, indeed.
Then, for finishing step 8, remind yourself that "universal numbers", "emulation" are
arithmetical relation.
Even, if, technically the heroin is
0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
+ the infinity of axioms: (F(0) & Ax(F(x) -> F(s(x))) -> AxF(x)
I never need to assume more, and in some sense, I don't assume more than:
0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
I hope you agree with them, for the natural numbers. The fact that it is a TOE is not
obvious, but it follows from UDA. And AUDA shows how to use it to test it with physics.
We can test machine's classical theology through its physical branch.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>
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