On 26 Jun 2015, at 03:39, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Jun 2015, at 14:27, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
My job was just to show that comp entails immaterialism,
And in that you have failed. MGA does not do it.
Where? Keep in mind that "comp entails immaterialism" is what MGA
provides the exact nuance we have to add. You can save materialism
by endowing something nobody can observe with magical ability to
select consciousness. Your statement is a bit nonsensical, without
telling me to which non computable process is involved.
I don't know that comp is true, but I don't know that comp is false
either.
In fact, nothing does it, because nothing that you have ever
mentioned requires the prior assumption of primitive materialism.
?
It is made explicit at step seven. You need this to have a notion
of concrete universal dovetailing running in the universe.
No. Steps 0 to 7 assume, implicitly or explicitly, the existence of
a physical universe.
No problem. But only in step seven do we suppose a concrete primary
physical universe, and that it is responsible for our experience (this
is the reductio-ad-absurdum hypothesis).
And you say explicitly in a number of places that it is not part of
your brief to deny the existence of the physical universe.
Of course.
The question is whether it is primitive or emergent. None of the
argument in steps 0-7 depends on this physical universe being
primary -- all that is required is that it exists.
Not in step seven, where more is required.
In step 7 you claim that if the UD is run in a sufficiently robust
universe,
"physics, as the 'correct' science for the concrete relative
predictions must be given by some measure on our consistent relative
states. .... Physics has been reduced to computer fundamental
psychology."
But there is a catch here. You have introduced the word "must"
without any justification. Even if the UD is run in a robust
universe, or in Platonia, it might well emulate all of physics in
some sense, but this does not mean that the physical universe is
emergent rather than primitive. The fact that one can compute
something, or emulate it, does not mean that it does not exist
independently. There is no entailment here. Or else computer models
of weather systems would create real cyclones and kill real people.
Assuming "real people" exist, but the MGA shows that we cannot use
that primitive matter to distinguish consciousness due to arithmetic,
or consciousness due to a relative physical implementation.
That is why you go on to step 8 and the MGA. But, as discussed
extensively, this argument fails.
We refute the critics, it seems to me.
It is, at best, an argument from incredulity, and at worst
incoherent. The scenario is that you replace the activity of the
conscious brain by a recording of that activity by removing physical
neurons and connections one by one, while replacing their activity
by projections from the recording. Is consciousness retained in this
process? Your assumption would seem to be that it is not, because if
it were, it would imply that the recoding is conscious, at least
while being played back in these circumstances. And you find this
absurd.
Assuming we survive the doctor operation in virtue of the implementing
the relevant computations. Not assuming that the Virgin Mary save your
soul.
But the alternative does not establish the required result either.
If the brain ceases to be conscious as the connections are removed
-- either gradually or with the loss of some critical number of
connections -- then the hypothesis of physical supervenience is
substantiated. If it remains conscious (even though simply replaying
a previous conscious experience) even when only the recording
playback remains, then physical supervenience is still
substantiated, because the recording is every bit as physical as the
original brain connections. In the "Yes, Doctor" argument, you are
agreeing to have your brain replaced by an emulation on a physical
computer. I doubt that even you would agree for the doctor to remove
your brain and replace it with a universal number tattooed
on your forehead.
You missed the argument. I will come back on this.
Note, again, that the MGA, even while it fails, is not dependent on
any notion of primitive physicality -- the argument would still run
even if the physical is wholly emergent from some more fundamental
stratum. MGA is just a failed argument. And your claim than comp
*entails* immaterialism collapses in a heap of illogic.
I think you just missed the point.
Bruno
Bruce
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