On 25 Jun 2015, at 14:27, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Jun 2015, at 08:27, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
It is step 5 which refutes definitely the closest continuer
theory in the computationalist frame.
The conclusions you wish to draw from step 5 might be incompatible
with the closest continuer account of personal identity. But that
does not refute the closest continuer theory --
OK.
it could equally be taken to refute comp.
If comp was under discussion. If you want put comp under
discussion, I am OK, although it is not part of my job.
What are we doing if not discussing comp?
Discussing comp's consequences. Taking the opportunity it gives to use
computer science and mathematical logic to get a mathematical
formulation of the first person/third person pronoun problems.
My job was just to show that comp entails immaterialism,
And in that you have failed. MGA does not do it.
Where? Keep in mind that "comp entails immaterialism" is what MGA
provides the exact nuance we have to add. You can save materialism by
endowing something nobody can observe with magical ability to select
consciousness. Your statement is a bit nonsensical, without telling me
to which non computable process is involved.
I don't know that comp is true, but I don't know that comp is false
either.
In fact, nothing does it, because nothing that you have ever
mentioned requires the prior assumption of primitive materialism.
?
It is made explicit at step seven. You need this to have a notion of
concrete universal dovetailing running in the universe.
Please study the work before showing your negative prejudices. It is
modest and it points on a trivial fact: science has not decided
between Plato and Aristotle.
The boring intra-aristotelian debate between God and Not God hides the
real original question of the greeks and indians: Universe or Not
Universe.
Comp provides a super-atheism, if theism is in the aristotelian sense,
as with comp, both a creator and a creation are not very plausible.
yet, we still get a Platonic sort of God, with its uny-many-private
aspects already reflected in the mind of the Turing universal numbers.
and a measure
problem (say), and in the math part I show the propositional logics
of the points of view, and the shadow of the measure we are
searching (that is the arithmetical quantization which appears on
the UD-arithmetic with the "material points of view" []p & p, []p &
<>t, []p & <>t & p, p sigma_1).
And that is singularly uninteresting, because it does not even come
close to relating to the real world.
Well, if comp is true, it is the real world. Come on, it is just
arithmetical truth, plus intensional computer science theoretical
higher level description.
It is computer science. You seem to forget the tautology: comp uses
computer science. We tackle a very complex, deep and hot question.
You argument is of the type: show me how String Theory can improve the
quality of the pizza.
The scientific approach would be to discuss whether the memory-
only account of personal identity better accounts for the real-
world data than the closest continuer theory.
I can argue that comp, and only comp today, fits the known
(quantum) facts.
You have explained no quantum facts.
Are you lying on purpose? The FPI gives at the least a reason to
generalize Everett QM, and the math *does* show quantization at the
place predicted.
All you have produced is a cat = dog argument. Viz, you take a
superficial resemblance between two things and then claim an
identity. This is not impressive.
You have shown that you know about nothing in (theoretical) computer
science.
You have admit not proposing an alternative to comp.
I am the conservative skeptic here.
It suggests a simple explanation (the many dreams already in
arithmetic, and the quantization which appears exactly where they
should).
Non computationalist theoreticians should at least suggest what is
not computational in the brain or in the body, and propose a non-
computational theory of mind. But in my opinion, this is premature
and is usually proposed by people having the 19th century (pre-
Gödelian) conception of machine.
You are the one that has claimed that the physical world is not
computable.
... that the physical world is not necessarily computable, and that
below its substitution/isolation level some random oracle is at play.
My contention is that the body (and the rest of the world) is
essential for a satisfactory account of personal identity.
I can understand, but that remains possibly true phenomenologically.
Unless you explain me why you use your theory to refuse a brain
transplant to a kids who will die without?
Of course "personal identity" notion get some blows from understanding
computationalism, and eventually it is more a question of right than
of truth.
I don't defend the truth, but show the theological consequences, the
one justifiable by the machine in some direct way, and the ten
thousand variant they get in less direct ways.
If you say that this means that the person is not computable, then I
am quite happy to go along with this.
The closest continuer account easily wins that battle.
You are quite quick here.
What does it predicts for symmetrical duplication, like in step 3?
Read Nozick, or many of my recent posts. In the duplication case
with ties, the theory predicts the formation of two new independent
persons.
I read it. I mention it in my long text, and show that Nozick's
position is incompatible with the physical closer continuer, but still
works on the arithmetical closer continuer, when the topology is given
by the semantics of the material hypostases.
so Nozick's idea is not completely wrong, but it refers to something
we get for free in arithmetic, without the use to commit ourself in a
world.
And what is the non computational element in the mind. Don't say
the "soul", as with comp, the soul exists and can be justified to
be non computational from its own point of view.
See above.
Frankly, with comp we do have a rich theology, which include
physics, so it is normal to dig on the consequences and see if comp
fits the data.
That is what I have been doing. And yet you say that comp is not
under discussion because that is not part of your job. You can't
even be consistent in what we are talking about.
My work shows only comp is testable, and is already better on qualia
than any other theories I hear about. But if you know better, I am
listening.
I am a scientist. I do not defend any proposition about any possible
reality. I derive beliefs from beliefs. I am a logician.
But, obviously, you can also give us a non comp theory of mind, and
do the same. No problem. yet, I remember that you told us that you
don't have such a theory. So why being negative on the only theory
which exists, and is believed more or less implicitly by most?
I said that I do not have a detailed physical account of the
workings of the mind, because I am a physicist, not a neurologist.
But a broad theory of mind is easily obtained. Mind (and
consciousness) supervene on the physical brain, and are the product
of the normal processes of Darwinian evolution. There is absolutely
no mystery here.
Hmm... I see.
I can agree with that. It might be true, or locally and relatively
plausible. But according to what you mean by "supervene on the
physical brain", it is very unclear. If you opt that such a
supervenience is preserved for a digital physical substitution, you
get the reversal. If you opt for not, you get back to the unsolved
mind-body problem, or dualism, etc.
Comp is not the only theory that exists.
No, but without comp, strong-AI look a bit solitary, and comp is only
the right to marry a man or woman having got an artificial brain.
With non comp, you need to add some magical marmalade, and you only
push the difficulties in the transfinite.
And even if it were, that does not mean that it is correct, or that
it cannot be legitimately criticized.
Sure. I have had long discussion with many non-comp participants. No
problem. As a logician I criticize only the invalid arguments against
comp, as well as the invalid argument against non-comp.
You are far too defensive of your theory, and show yourself
completely closed even to discussion of the theory, and much more
closed to critical evaluation of the theory.
No, on the contrary. I trust it at the point of knowing it defends all
by itself. It is not my theory, it is the theory of the universal
machine before she get propaganda.
I am open to any theology which I can make sense of. But the
aristotelian works not well with computationalism, that is what I
explain. I predicted that this naive AUDA interview would be refuted
before 2000, and well, it is not yet. As many told me, the subject is
still taboo, and I still don't know why, beside the possible shock for
Aristotelian bigots that we can easily imagine.
I am not defensive at all. You have not yet begun to really think on
the matter. You say yourself that you are a physicist, and two second
later you come up with a solution of the mind-body problem. Do you
really think that all theologians and philosophers of mind are idiot
or what? This is simply ridiculous.
I am not defensive, but I have no clues why you might even think so.
You seem to be able to think, so, if patient enough, you can grasp the
whole things, but you will need to study some books. UDA is shorter,
but step 7 is falsely simple, as it relies on Church thesis deeply
than people thought, as does step 8.
The physical reality is in the head of the universal Turing machine,
and she can find it by looking inward, and we get that it is a quantum
reality, only more math, and perhaps more physics, can help us to see
if we will get a difference. *That* would be a trace of perverse
emulation, or special oracle, or non comp.
With comp, the quantum can be interpreted by the fact that we *are* at
the "physical", first person plural sharable level. Human's type of
consciousness might require long deep histories, and stabilization
might require quantum phase randomization to get rid of the white
rabbits. But this remains to be proved.
Bruno
Bruce
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