On 01 Jul 2015, at 03:33, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 07:14:29PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 Jun 2015, at 01:27, Bruce Kellett wrote:
My conclusion is that, overall, his arguments do not entail the
conclusions he seeks to draw.
So yes, I seek to defeat his 'proofs', not necessarily to prove
the contrary.
Ok, but I honestly think that you failed.
At step 7, you, yourself, admit that physicality, or "concreteness" of
the primitive ontology has no bearing on phenomenal reality.
I am not sure I understand why you say this. At step seven, I still
accept the idea that perhaps a concrete ontological physical universe
is needed for comp to enact consciousness. We get the reversal, but
only assuming he robust physical universe. We can conclude and stop
here with some strong Occam razor.
You
haven't proven immateriality, just that the primitive physicality is
an
unnecessary assumption.
At step seven yes.
You need to wield Occam's razor to eliminate
primitive physicality.
At step seven? A strong one, yes.
I might be happy with this, but perhaps Bruce isn't.
Step 8 doesn't address this issue at all, as it seems inapplicable to
a robust universe.
Step 8 eliminates the need to assume the robust universe to get the
reversal.
Step 8 shows that a robust universe, if it plays any role related to
consciousness, give matter non Turing emulable properties, making comp
false. If primitive matter plays a non Turing emulable role, I can no
more be sure that the doctor can get the subst level right. Step
allows to conclude to non-physicalism, using now just the usual weak
occam razor used in amy applied science.
Bruno
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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected]
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