On 07 Aug 2015, at 21:09, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 8:40 PM, Pierz <[email protected]> wrote:
> My point isn't that MWI is true. My point is you understand
it and how it leads to the appearance of indeterminacy in a
completely determined system. Indeterminacy is a 1-p illusion
It's either an illusion or it is not and peepee is not
involved. And it is an experimental fact that Bell's inequality
is violated therefore we know for certain that if things really are
deterministic then even stranger things must be true; either things
are not realistic (an electron is not spinning clockwise or
counterclockwise until it is measured, nothing exists until it is
observed) or non-local (forget the butterfly effect, a hurricane
arrived in Miami today because one year in the *future* a butterfly
in Australia will flap his wings). So we know for sure that
Einstein's idea that things are realistic, local, and
deterministic can not be correct, at least one of them must
be false and all 3 could be.
>> If the multiverse really exists then that explains quantum
indeterminacy, but Bruno claims he has found a new sort of
indeterminacy independent of both the quantum type and also of the
Godel/Turing type and I don't think he has.
> To my mind, the logic is completely isomorphic with MWI.
MWI says everything that can happen to you will happen to you,
so you can see everything that can happen; the only way these 2
things can be consistent with experience is if there are lots and
lots of "yous" but the laws of physics only allow an observer (or a
you) to see one of them. And that is why Bruno loves pronouns and
that is why despite the criticism Bruno insists on continuing to use
the word "you"; pronouns like that disguise the fact that "you" is
not singular, it is plural.
It is plural in the 3-1 view, but it remains singular in the 1-view.
The JC who sees M can only say: "I see M and not W". The JC who sees W
can only say "I see W and not M".
Admittedly Bruno does say "THE 1p you" but unfortunately always
neglects to mention which 1p you.
Why do you still say that? Did I not insist that we need to interview
*all* copies?
Well OK Bruno does say THE 1p you who wrote all that stuff in the
diary, but that does no good because after the duplication Bruno is
unable to point to the one guy who wrote all that stuff in the
diary.
Why do you still say that. You have repeated this many times, and I
have always told you that "the one guy", being, from the 3p-view, in
both W *and* M, must be very naturally interviewed in both W and M,
and indeed both confirms the prediction that they saw only one city, -
and were unable to predict which one in advance.
> If Bruno is claiming there is some striking originality about
his idea of FPI then I'd point to Everett and say, that guy thought
of it first.
Everett said nothing about consciousness and didn't need to, one
great strength of Many Worlds is that unlike some other quantum
interpretations it doesn't need to explain what consciousness is or
how it works because consciousness has nothing to do with it.
Everett talk about consciousness or subjective experience, and what is
nice, use computationalism, but then he fails to see that the
indterminacy, a priori, get larger than the one given by the universal
wave, and so, if we want savev both comp and QM, we will have to
justify the QM by the same type of phenomenology used by Everett to
justofy the collapse. With comp, both the collapse and the wave
becomes machine's phenomenology.
Bruno's great discovery is in finding out that sometimes "you"
doesn't know what "you" will see next, but I think Og The Caveman
beat him to the punch on that by a few years.
OK, you oscillate again. Tell me if Og the Caveman has gone as far as
step 4, and 5, and 6, ...
You are the only one insisting that step 3 already deserves the Nobel
Prize ...
> Obviously Bruno's argument hypothesises this first-person
indeterminacy occurring in a context of computationally defined
observers (whether in a physical machine, a duplication experiment,
or pure mathematics) rather than the multiverse, but that context is
irrelevant to the question of the validity of the logic
But it is not irrelevant to the question of pronouns and
Bruno's arguments are always filled wall to wall with pronouns.
You are quite unfair. Not only I have given presentation, just for
you, without pronouns (and others have done that too), but we have
explained why "pronouns" are not problematic, once you put the "1" or
"3" or '3-1" in front of them.
You do point on a difficulty which plays an important role in the
mathematical translation. Indeed, once you defined a machine or person
by its set of beliefs, the 1-you can be proved to be undefinable, like
truth or consciousness.
But UDA has been constructed to avoid that difficulty: the reversal
does not need to get a precise definition. It is enough that you agree
that you don't die in the duplication, because this made usable the
simpler pure 3p definition that we have agreed on: the 1-you in
Helsinki is the usual you (before duplication, you agree this is not
ambiguous", and the 1-you after duplication is both the 1-you in W
*and* the 1-you in M, and that is why to confirm or reftute the
prediction we have to interview both of them, and then, it is obvious
that both confirms the W v M prediction, and both refute the W & M
prediction.
The the problem of getting a more detailed account of the 1-you is
given by the 8 mathematical hypostases. But that is needed only to
extract physics from self-reference. It is NOT needed for the simpler
task of showing why *we have to* do such extraction if we bet on
computationalism.
When discussing the multiverse the very laws of physics ensure that
pronouns cause no ambiguity, but that is certainly not the case with
people duplicating machines.
But you fail to show the relevance of this. Imagine QM appears to be
non linear. People like Plaga and Weinberg have shown that in such a
case, the "parallel universe " would be capable of interaction, would
that makes the phenomenological quantum uncertainty suddenly disappear?
Or let us decide to add in the step 3 protocol a close that the W and
W guy will never met. Would you then accept that there is an
indeterminacy. You should, but then it is easy to justify that it is
not relevant for the P(W) = 1/2, given that we might decide to obey or
not obey to that clause, without any observable change in the brain of
the reconstituted person. So, such clause cannot have any incidence on
the proediction, unless you add some magic in the brains, which is
disallowed by computationalism.
Stage magicians use pretty assistants to distract the
audience fromtheir sleight of hand, Bruno uses
pronouns. Bruno says that computationalism can't
predict what YOU will see next so there must be some aspect of
consciousness that the computational theory of mind can not
explain, but in reality what computationalism (or anything
else) can't explain is what the hell Bruno means by "you".
It is plain false, see above. Try to forget your prejudices and focus
on the definitions which have been given.
Try to avoid the ambiguity that you add by avoiding the distinction
between:
The 3-1-you which are in both places, and the 1-1-you which are the
(incompatible) content of the experiences of the 1-you in both place,
seen from the 1p-view.
In both place, they feel to see directly only *one* city, making the
Helsinki prediction P(W v M) = 1 obviously correct, and the prediction
P(W & M) = 0 obviously false, as the question is on the 1-1 views, or
the 1-view's content seen from the 1-views, and not on the 3-1-views,
which is just the correct description of the protocol, of course.
All right? Just interview all copies, the vague definition given are
precise enough to handle this rigorously and quite easily, as you seem
to get again. But if it is so easy for the Og cave man, just tell me
if the Og cave man agrees that whatever way we would quantify the
indeterminacy, the prediction will remain invariant when adding a
delay of reconstitution in one of the cities. Is that simple too for
the Og man?
Bruno
John K Clark
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