On 06 Oct 2015, at 04:29, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Oct 5, 2015  Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:

​>> ​ I'm not dogmatic on the subject but I have​ ​ grave​ ​doubts​ ​about​ ​the existence of computation in arithmetic; certainly​ ​nobody has ever seen​ ​even a hint of​ ​such a thing.

You are dead wrong here, as we don't need a hint, we have a proof,

​A proof can't make a single calculation, but a silicon microprocessor can. ​



Sigma_1 complete provability is Turing universal, and it can not only compute all computable functions, but compute them in any possible way.




​> ​and it is in all textbook in mathematical logic.

​And a textbook in mathematical logic​ can't make ​a single calculation either, but a silicon microprocessor can. ​

​> ​Unless you allude to a notion of "physical computation" which has not been defined.

​P​hysical computation​ means just what it seems to mean, computation done physically; if you still find that response unsatisfactory then you need to define define.

No, the problem is that in "computation done physically", what do you mean by computation? If you mean it in the usual standard sense, then that is OK, but then all I say is that no Turing machine can aver distinguish an arithmetical computation from a physical one, without external clues.




​> ​ physical existence of the physical implementation of arithmetical computation. That is possible.

​I agree, I am certain that exists, I am far far less certain about the existence of the mathematical ​implementation of ​ physical​ computation.


But I was talking on the computations in arithmetic. None of them are physical a priori, because the physical will be an appearance emerging from the FPI statistics on *all* of them. Arithmetic can simulate a silicon processor simulating a Turing machine, but arithmetic might not been able to simulate exactly the silicon atom, as it cannot simulate 2^aleph_0 computations at once.




​> ​You can emulate the (universal) computation even with only diophantine degree four polynomial.

​And yet for some strange reason INTEL ​still uses silicon and not diophantine degree four polynomial. How odd.


No, that is not odd. INTEL sold machine for physical computations. But the point is that with computationalisme, we must justify the existence of the appearance of the physical computations from the arithmetical one, or from any Turing universal system.





​> ​You are unaware of what is a computation in computer science.

​It is finding a particular solution to a particular arithmetical problem


Hmm... Not quite close.





​>> ​​If you know how to do that then for God's sake stop talking about it and just do it, start the Sigma 1 PARA Hardware Corporation ​and change the world!​

​> ​Straw man.

​Straw man my ass!! If somebody claims to be able to do something it is not unreasonable to ask to see them actually do it and not just talk about it.


You confuse "that physical entity can do this computation", with the arithmetical reality (a tiny part of the standard model of RA) emulate (in the sense of Church-Turing) this computation".







If you are correct about arithmetic being able to make calculations without the help of physics I can see absolutely no why the ​Sigma 1 PARA Hardware Corporation would't be a HUGE success, and yet nobody including you wants to start such a company. How odd.

​> ​The notion of computation does not assume silicon, nor QM or anything like that.

​If so then "the notion of computation​" can't actually perform one ​single calculation, but a silicon microchip can.


lol








​>​>>​ ​ you accept comp,

​>>​I do not accept "comp".

​> ​You do.

​No I do not.​

 ​        ​>​>>​ Comp is put for computationalism.

​>> ​No it is not. Over the years I have heard you say hundred​ s​​ maybe thousands​ of times "according to comp this and according to comp th​a​t", ​> ​Because that hs been proved, published, peer-reviewed, and accepted

​It's certainly not accepted by Wikipedia, it lists ​29​​ passable meanings of "comp" and not one of them has anything to do with AI or consciousness or computations or anything you're talking about.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comp
Google doesn't know what the hell you mean by "comp" either, try it for yourself.


Of course, I use that abbreviation only in this list. it is a private thing between us, to avoid typing something like "the computationalist theory of mind", or "the computationalist hypothesis in cognitive science".





​>> ​I am ​still ​unable to form a coherent picture of what ​you're talking about​​;​ but I have a ​very ​clear understanding of​ ​computationalism so I know that ​whatever "comp" is it certainly isn't computationalism.

​> ​Because you stop at step 3,

​Because you made a blunder in step 3 that you won't or can't fix. ​Who in their right mind would keep reading a proof after they found a flaw?


Everyone interested in the domain, it might help to fix the blunder, or to realize the blunder is not relevant, or that it was not a blunder.

You are the guy who has been shown believing that 0 = 1, remember? You want suffer again or what?

I challenge anyone else to explain your refutation here. Up to now all your tricks have been debunked in all details. The last one, based on deliberately missing the difference between the first person and third person view has been debunked many times. Everyone saw through you. But if you want push the ridicule even more, go for it: try to convince someone else to explain your point here.

Bruno




​>​>>​ ​You need a physical reality only to implement a physical computation. But that is trivial,

​>> ​Try telling the stockholders​ and​ scientists​ at​ INTEL it's trivial!

​> ​Straw man again.

Try telling the stockholders​ and​ scientists​ at​ INTEL it's ​a straw man!!​ ​

  John K Clark​





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