On 07 Oct 2015, at 03:58, John Clark wrote:



On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 3:17 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:

​> ​Sigma_1 complete provability is Turing universal,

​But the proof or that can't compute one damn thing!​ ​No proof can.​

That is false. Sigma_1 provability can compute what any other universal system can compute, and even in the same way/algorithm.





​> ​the problem is that in "computation done physically", what do you mean by computation?

​As I've ​said over and over and over again. I mean the process of finding a specific answer to a specific problem.

That is "solving a problem", not computing a function. But that stoo can exist in arithmetic, and is a-handled more with the RE sets (the w_i), than with the phi_i. In that case, you still rely oin the purely mathematical theory. No physical assumption is needed, still less metaphysical materialist assumption.




​> ​If you mean it in the usual standard sense, then

​I mean the sort of computation that people are interested in, ​ the sort they will pay money for, the sort of computations that INTEL does.

OK? but that is not the standard one.




​> ​no Turing machine can aver distinguish an arithmetical computation from a physical one,

​That's not all it can't do! Unless the machine is made of matter that obeys the laws of physics no Turing machine can distinguish ANYTHING, and the blueprints of a 747 can flt you across the Atlantic either.

False. true only if you add physical as a quality for the result.





​> ​without external clues.

​In other word physical external clues can provide something pure mathematics can not.​

If computationalism is correct, the physical is an epitsemological reality, not an ontological one.





​> ​ I was talking on the computations in arithmetic.None of them are physical

​There are no computations IN arithmetic, computations are always done ​TO arithmetic by physics.

Physical computations might do that. But arithmetical computations, which can emulate *all* computations (with Church-Turing thesis- does not assume anything physical.




​> ​Arithmetic can simulate a silicon processor​ simulating a Turing machine,

​You've got it exactly backwards. The simple must simulate the complex not the reverse, otherwise there would be no point in doing simulations. A silicon processor is vastly more complex than a Turing machine. ​

All universal beings can simulate all universal beings when doing computations.
It go in both direction.




​​>> ​And yet for some strange reason INTEL ​still uses silicon and not diophantine degree four polynomial. How odd.

​> ​No, that is not odd. INTEL sold machine for physical computations.

​And INTEL makes machines like that because billions of people will happily pay trillions of dollars for physical computations, but they won't spend a nickle for a non-physical computation​. Maybe those billions of people know something you don't.

By definition, if those computations did not exist in arithmetic, they would not exist in the physical reality either. INTEL needs both mathematicians and physical engineers. The notion of computation has just nothing to do with physics. read the book by Davis with the original papers for god sake.

Bruno


​> ​You are the guy who has been shown believing that 0 = 1, remember?

​No, I do not remember and that is surprising. Zero being equal to one would be big news and I would have thought I would have remembered that.

 John K Clark​





--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Reply via email to