O​
n Fri, Oct 2, 2015 at 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wr rote

>  you seem to doubt that the existence of computation in arithmetic.


Yes, I'm not dogmatic on the subject but I have
​ ​
grave
​ ​
doubts
​ ​
about
​ ​
the existence of computation in arithmetic; certainly
​ ​
nobody has ever seen
​ ​
even a hint of
​ ​
such a thing.

> your argument relies on a notion of physical computation.

Yes, I have no doubts whatsoever
​about​
 the existence of computation in physics.

> When I ask what that is, your definition seems to be "implementation of
> computation (in the arithmetical sense) in a physical reality,
> ​​
> which contradicts your statement that computation does not exist in
> arithmetic.


Arithmetical objects
​(like numbers) ​
can be
​ ​
computed
​ ​
no doubt about
​,​
it
​ ​
but
​ ​
as far as we know
​ ​
not by arithmetic, only by physics.

​> ​
> which contradicts your statement that computation does not exist in
> arithmetic.

​There is no contradiction, ​a
rithmetical objects
​​
can certainly be
​computed​

​but the question is what is doing the computing, is physics doing it or
is arithmetic doing it to itself? I think physics is more likely.

> you persist in confusing what is a computation in the CHurch-Turing sense,


​If ​

​"​
computation in the C
​h​
urch-Turing sense
​" doesn't mean finding a particular solution to a particular arithmetical
problem then "
computation in the C
​h​
urch-Turing sense
​"  INTEL would not find it interesting and neither would I.​


> ​> ​
> none of those theories can perform calculations, no theory can,

​I agree​

Actually theory are not necessarily supposed to be able to do that,


​I agree. ​


​> ​
> only machine (in the mathematical sense) can do that.



​O​
nl
​​
y
​a ​
machine (in the
​PHYSICAL​
 sense) can do that.

​> ​
> Now, it happens that if a theory is sigma_1 complete, like RA and PA, they
> can do that, because such theories are universal machine


​If you know how to do that then for God's sake stop talking about it and
just do it, start the Sigma 1 PARA Hardware Corporation ​
and change the world!
​

​> ​
> Physical material can do that [computation]  in the physical world

Yes and only physical material can do that
​,​
and I have a explanation of why that is so. You do not.

> but here we talk about the computation done in arithmetic.


No
​,​
​ ​
here we talk about the computation done *TO* arithmetical
​ ​
objects
​ ​
(
​
by physics). Arithmetic is unchanging, nothing can be done in it; if you
want to
​ ​
actually
​ ​
DO something and not just define something physics is needed.

> obviously, we cannot use them in any direct way, like we can do with a
> physical machine.

If mathematics is more fundamental than physics as you say
​ ​
then ​it's about as far from obvious as you can get
​ ​
to understand ​
​
WHY we can't
​ ​
do​
​ ​
calculations directly but must
​ ​
instead ​get our hands dirty and
​​
mess around with
​ ​
elements such as ​silicon.

​> ​
>  you accept comp,

I do not accept "comp".

> > All your post illustrates that you are a sort of comp believer.

  None of my posts illustrates that
​
 I am a "comp" believer.

> Comp is put for computationalism.


No it is not. Over the years I have heard you say hundred
​s​
​ maybe thousands​
of times "according to comp this and according to comp th
​a​
t", but I am
​still ​
unable to form a coherent picture of what
​you're talking about​
​;​
but I have a
​very ​
clear understanding of
​ ​
computationalism
 so I know that ​
whatever "comp" is it certainly isn't computationalism.

>
> ​> ​
> That computations exist in arithmetic (even in the small sigma_1 complete
> part) is accepted by all experts

And yet for some strange reason like you none of these experts have become
filthy rich by starting a computer hardware company that doesn't need to
manufacture hardware.
​I find that very odd.​

> Of course. But once Turing defined calculation/computation
> ​ [...]​
>
If definitions could make calculations INTEL
 ​
would make definitions instead of silicon microchips because making
definitions is
​one hell of a lot​
 easier than making physical objects.

​> ​
> it has been proved that it exists in any model of arithmetic, a fortiori
> in the standard model.


​Proofs are no more adept than definitions at making calculations.  ​


​> ​
> You need a physical reality only to implement a physical computation. But
> that is trivial,

Try telling the stockholders
​and​
 scientists
​at
 INTEL it's trivial!

>> if you want to know a particular solution to a particular problem in
>> arithmetic because neither proofs nor theorems can make a calculation; for
>> that you need physics.
>
>

> Yes, but it happens that we are not interested in having a solution, but
> only in their existence,

Then you're not interested in computations
​.​

​T​
here is no disputing matters of taste but I am interested in computations
and so is INTEL.

​ John K Clark​










> How could a universal Turing machine makes the difference between an
implementation in arithmetic and an implementation in a physical reality?


"I compute therefore I am physical", or even more fundamentally   "I am not
static therefore I am physica l".


  John K Clark

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