On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 6:16 PM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On 10/13/2015 3:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On 14 October 2015 at 09:46, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> >> On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> >> ... >> Standard computationalism does not say anything about whether matter is >> primary or not. It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that >> thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism disagree. >> They believe either that is not possible to make a computer that behaves >> like a human because there is non-computable physics in the brain (eg. >> Roger Penrose), or that it is possible to make a computer that behaves like >> a human but not one that thinks like a human (eg. John Searle). >> >> >> But the problem with what you say is that on this list "computationalism" >> tends to mean much more than, "you can make a computer (or a robot) that >> thinks and acts like a human". Bruno claims to have proven that your >> simple statement logically entails that all of physics and consciousness. >> But that is not so generally accepted and so when someone "reject >> computationalism" here, it may be they are just rejecting the inferences >> Bruno claims it entails. >> > > I take Bruno's term "comp" to mean computationalism plus the conclusions > he draws from it. > > > But with that extended meaning, the following two sentences are not true: > "It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that thinks and acts > like a human. Those opposed to computationalism disagree." Those who > reject (extended) computationalism, may very well agree. > If someone believes computationalism does not lead to the extended conclusions Bruno drew from it, it is on them to show where Bruno's argument is wrong. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
