On 14 Oct 2015, at 08:17, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 14/10/2015 4:45 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
Cochlear implants and artificial retinas give evidence toward
multiple realizability, and therefore, against mind-
brain identity theory. They show that it is functional equivalence,
rather than material/compositional equivalence that
matters. Since computers can realize any finite function, then
assuming there are no necessary infinities within the brain,
computers can realize any functional state the brain is able to
realize. For physicalism to be correct, you have to believe either
that functional states are irrelevant to consciousness, or that
physics can instantiate functional states which Turing machines
cannot.
That is simply false.
Again it's not clear what you mean by computationalism. Bruce can
speak for himself, but I think he agrees that strong AI is possible.
Strong AI implies consciousness is substrate independent. But I
thought Bruce argued against consciousness being derivable from
mathematical computations, which would mean consciousness is
substrate dependent: that it depends on physically implemented
Turing machines.
I certainly argued that consciousness could not be sustained on
platonic computations in arithmetic. But that was because I do not
accept that such things exist. In mathematics you have descriptions
of Turing machines and descriptions of computations, but no live
machines or computations. Substrate independence simply means that
you can replace all or part of the human brain with computer-based
equivalents.
That is comp. And then comp entails that there is no such primitive
substance capable of selecting a computation for consciousness.
In other words, strong AI.
That is incorrect. Strong AI just says that digital machine can think/
be-conscious. This does not logically entails that human or me are
machine. machine might be conscious does not entail logically that
only machines can be conscious.
But of course, if you agree that I (and you) am conscious, comp
entails strong AI, as I or you would be example of thinking/conscious
machine.
No need for platonia in order to say that consciousness is
independent of the substrate.
But you need the "arithmetical platonia" to even define the term
computation. No platonia entails no notion of computation at all.
Why? Arithmetic is system of propositions. Whether it is real or
not has no effect on Church-Turing.
Then you should be equally happy to have your brain implemented by
"unreal computations" as "real computations" :-)
Computations in platonia are 'unreal' -- they do not exist, so
cannot implement anything.
In a sense of implementation different from the standard sense.
and it's difficult to make sense of computationalism if you can no
longer define computation or computability. So if you accept
computationalism, you are implicitly accepting infinity and
arithmetical realism. Given this, the rest of Bruno's result is a
logical proof, which is either correct or has an error.
No, you missed the point that it is not a logical proof. It's an
argument from incredulity.
"A Turing Machine either reaches a halting state or runs forever"
"A Turing Machine can emulate any other Turing machine"
"A Turing Machine has an unlimited tape"
None of the above items are true for physical approximations of
Turing machines. If these basic principals of computer science are
not true for physical Turing machines, then what kind of Turing
machines are they true for? Is Computer Science founded on lies, or
does it concern itself with a recently-discovered mathematical
object for which these statements are true?
The definition is of an ideal Turing machine. No such ideal machine
exists. Mathematical objects are idealizations: they do not exist.
Any realization of a mathematical objects is necessarily less than
ideal.
Well, you just assert that you believe in Aristotle theology. No
problem as you accept that comp has to be false in that case. But comp
is just what you called string-ai above. It is the assumption leading
to the epistemological and ontological reversal.
Bruno
Bruce
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