On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 11:59 PM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On 10/13/2015 8:50 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 10:21 PM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> >> >> On 10/13/2015 7:22 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 9:04 PM, Brent Meeker < <[email protected]> >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On 10/13/2015 6:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 6:16 PM, Brent Meeker < <[email protected]> >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 10/13/2015 3:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 14 October 2015 at 09:46, Brent Meeker < <[email protected]> >>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ... >>>>> Standard computationalism does not say anything about whether matter >>>>> is primary or not. It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that >>>>> thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism disagree. >>>>> They believe either that is not possible to make a computer that behaves >>>>> like a human because there is non-computable physics in the brain (eg. >>>>> Roger Penrose), or that it is possible to make a computer that behaves >>>>> like >>>>> a human but not one that thinks like a human (eg. John Searle). >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> But the problem with what you say is that on this list >>>>> "computationalism" tends to mean much more than, "you can make a computer >>>>> (or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human". Bruno claims to have >>>>> proven that your simple statement logically entails that all of physics >>>>> and >>>>> consciousness. But that is not so generally accepted and so when someone >>>>> "reject computationalism" here, it may be they are just rejecting the >>>>> inferences Bruno claims it entails. >>>>> >>>> >>>> I take Bruno's term "comp" to mean computationalism plus the >>>> conclusions he draws from it. >>>> >>>> >>>> But with that extended meaning, the following two sentences are not >>>> true: "It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that thinks and >>>> acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism disagree." Those who >>>> reject (extended) computationalism, may very well agree. >>>> >>> >>> If someone believes computationalism does not lead to the extended >>> conclusions Bruno drew from it, it is on them to show where Bruno's >>> argument is wrong. >>> >>> >>> Or why it's conclusion doesn't follow necessarily - which I and others >>> have done. >>> >>> >> I missed this. Could you point to the posts where you showed this? >> >> >> No, I don't keep posts that long, but I can summarize some of the >> arguments. >> >> 1. Bruno's argument that recapitulating a recording doesn't instantiate >> consciousness is a mere argument from incredulity and doesn't logic entail >> its conclusion. In fact the whole MGA is an argument from incredulity. >> > > The computations involved in playing back a recording of a given X by Y > pixel image are constant regardless of what the recording shows. Therefore > I don't see how one could argue (assuming computationalism) that a > recording invokes the computation one presumes is necessary to instantiate > a conscious state. > > > "Presume" is the operative word there. > > Okay, I think we agree then. You can have a theory that says a recording is consciousness, but then that isn't computationalism. And if it isn't computationalism then you can't use that as an argument against the logic used in the UDA which starts from the assumption of computationalism. > > >> Mallah, who has his own version of the argument, takes the reductio to >> prove computationalism is false. >> > > So then what is his theory of mind? > > > Dunno, probably physicalism. But he's not obliged to have an alternative > in order to reject one premise of a reductio. > > I'm nor familiar enough with his argument to comment. > > >> >> 2. Bruno's argument depends on the MG being conscious while isolated. He >> tries to make this plausible by supposing that his scenario takes place as >> a dream; but this is not convincing. Even a dream needs prior experience >> of an outside world. >> > > Do you deny the possibility of mind uploading on the account that it could > be isolated from the outside world? > > > Yes. A brain in a vat with no connections would not be able to sustain > consciousness. > Can you dream? > > > > >> So on reflection it is not plausible that consciousness can exist >> independent of an external world. It may be that physics can be derived >> from arithmetic, but it is not enough to say that self-evaluation exists in >> arithmetic. For the theory to work it must produce a world to be conscious >> of, and so far it doesn't do that. Bruno just writes things like, IF comp >> is true then physics must follow. But that's like saying IF Christianity >> is true Jesus will return. >> > > There is a lot of independent evidence for computationalism. > > > Name some that's not also compatible with physicalism. > Cochlear implants and artificial retinas give evidence toward multiple realizability, and therefore, against mind-brain identity theory. They show that it is functional equivalence, rather than material/compositional equivalence that matters. Since computers can realize any finite function, then assuming there are no necessary infinities within the brain, computers can realize any functional state the brain is able to realize. For physicalism to be correct, you have to believe either that functional states are irrelevant to consciousness, or that physics can instantiate functional states which Turing machines cannot. > > > The Church-Turing Thesis means a computer can perfectly replicate all > human behaviors. > > > First, it's a "thesis", not a fact. > It's as well accepted as any theory in physics. > Second, it doesn't mean that an abstract computation can replicate human > behavior. > It does. But you would say that it would result in a zombie. > If human cogitation is Turing emulable, it may still have to be physically > realized, > The Church-Turing thesis says nothing about computers having to be built out of electrons and quarks. > which means its finite, which means the infinities of arithmetic are not > necessary to intelligence or consciousness. > I don't think infinities are necessary to consciousness. It just so happens that in arithmetical realism, there are infinite numbers of platonically existing computations. > > > A rejection of zombies, or a rejection of the idea that we can have no > reliable knowledge of our own conscious states + Church-Turing Thesis gives > you computationalism. > > > But what do you mean by "computationalism"? > That the proper computation results in consciousness. > Just that consciousness can be instantiated by an artifact?...by a digital > computer? Or does "computationalism" imply all the inferences Bruno argues > for, but which are not commonly accepted. > My above insertion was that the "No zombie principal" + "Church-Turing thesis = true" -> computationalism. It is the UDA which says computationalism -> the reversal. If the UDA is correct, then transitively "No zombie principal" + "Church-Turing thesis = true" -> the reversal. > > > > >> >> 3. Peter Jones wrote several critiques pointing out that there is no >> reason to suppose a UDA exists, it's merely a hypothetical abstraction. A >> related criticism is that Bruno assumes arithmetic is infinite in order to >> use Godel's theorems about what a system cannot prove about itself. But >> physics doesn't need infinities, they are just calculational conveniences. >> > > Ultrafinitism is a fringe theory which leads to a break down of > mathematics as we know it. I think it is an extreme length to go to reject > the UDA, to say there is a biggest number to which 1 cannot be added to. > > > That's just your prejudice. Try reading Feng Ye and Jan Mycielski. I > think it's telling that you look at the mere existence of alternative > number theory as destroying "mathematics as we know it". Mathematics is > just a bunch of axiom/theorem systems. There's no one really real > mathematics any more than there's one real language. > Well then, if there are many mathematics, and they are all equally valid (as you say), then we inhabit the ones that contain Universal Dovetailers. > > > > >> >> 4. Bruno leans heavily on saying his theory explains QM, but it's not >> clear to me that it's even consistent with QM. For example how is the >> operation of Shor's algorithm consistent with the multiple threads of the >> UDA? >> >> I think Bruce Kellet has also made some critiques of Bruno's argument. >> > > Bruce's argument is that computationalism is false, and arithmetical > realism is false. If you reject these, it is no conflict with the UDA, > whose logic depends on those assumptions. > > > Again it's not clear what you mean by computationalism. Bruce can speak > for himself, but I think he agrees that strong AI is possible. > > Strong AI implies consciousness is substrate independent. But I thought Bruce argued against consciousness being derivable from mathematical computations, which would mean consciousness is substrate dependent: that it depends on physically implemented Turing machines. > > Your argument in #1 and #2, also rests implicity on a rejection of > computationslim. #1 implies the computations don't matter, and #2 implies > the right computations don't matter if they are isolated. > > >> It is a red herring to ask "where is the error" because I don't think his >> argument is a fallacy; I think it is less than logic entailment. >> > > You can dispute the assumptions (computationalism, infinity, arithmetical > realism, etc.) but if you reject infinity or arithmetical realism, you must > also reject Church-Turing's thesis, > > > Why? Arithmetic is system of propositions. Whether it is real or not has > no effect on Church-Turing. > Then you should be equally happy to have your brain implemented by "unreal computations" as "real computations" :-) > > > and it's difficult to make sense of computationalism if you can no longer > define computation or computability. So if you accept computationalism, you > are implicitly accepting infinity and arithmetical realism. Given this, the > rest of Bruno's result is a logical proof, which is either correct or has > an error. > > > No, you missed the point that it is not a logical proof. It's an argument > from incredulity. > "A Turing Machine either reaches a halting state or runs forever" "A Turing Machine can emulate any other Turing machine" "A Turing Machine has an unlimited tape" None of the above items are true for physical approximations of Turing machines. If these basic principals of computer science are not true for physical Turing machines, then what kind of Turing machines are they true for? Is Computer Science founded on lies, or does it concern itself with a recently-discovered mathematical object for which these statements are true? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
