On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 9:04 PM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On 10/13/2015 6:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 6:16 PM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> >> >> On 10/13/2015 3:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> >> >> On 14 October 2015 at 09:46, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> >>> >>> ... >>> Standard computationalism does not say anything about whether matter is >>> primary or not. It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that >>> thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism disagree. >>> They believe either that is not possible to make a computer that behaves >>> like a human because there is non-computable physics in the brain (eg. >>> Roger Penrose), or that it is possible to make a computer that behaves like >>> a human but not one that thinks like a human (eg. John Searle). >>> >>> >>> But the problem with what you say is that on this list >>> "computationalism" tends to mean much more than, "you can make a computer >>> (or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human". Bruno claims to have >>> proven that your simple statement logically entails that all of physics and >>> consciousness. But that is not so generally accepted and so when someone >>> "reject computationalism" here, it may be they are just rejecting the >>> inferences Bruno claims it entails. >>> >> >> I take Bruno's term "comp" to mean computationalism plus the conclusions >> he draws from it. >> >> >> But with that extended meaning, the following two sentences are not true: >> "It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that thinks and acts >> like a human. Those opposed to computationalism disagree." Those who >> reject (extended) computationalism, may very well agree. >> > > If someone believes computationalism does not lead to the extended > conclusions Bruno drew from it, it is on them to show where Bruno's > argument is wrong. > > > Or why it's conclusion doesn't follow necessarily - which I and others > have done. > > I missed this. Could you point to the posts where you showed this? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
