On 10/26/2015 11:57 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-10-27 7:44 GMT+01:00 Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net
<mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>:
On 10/26/2015 3:37 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 10:44:28AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 10/26/2015 2:43 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
Assuming computationalism, our everyday experience
_is_ internal to the
system. That doesn't make it any less meaningful.
I think that's a confusion. The system is the universe
with it's
physics. So in a sense everything is internal to it. But
experience is individual and it's meaningful because the
individual
has values and memory and so incorporates experiences into
decisions
about future actions...that's what constitutes giving them
semantics.
Hi Brent, I appreciate your point of view very much, but I
fail to see
how what you say is incompatible with my claim. Where is the
confusion?
I think our everyday experience is given meaning as referring to
things outside ourselves. So it's not internal to "the system"
that is the experiencer. It is only because the observer is
distinct from the rest of the world that he can form meaningful
symbolic representations of it.
The only clarification I would make is that (with
computationalism)
the system is formal, but the observer (individual in your
terminology) and environment (universe with its physics in your
terminology) are a non formal partition of the system.
I'm not sure what you mean by non-formal partition. If your brain
is replaced by a I/O functionally equivalent digital computer it
will still be in an environment and will have internal
representations that refer to the environment.
In a computer... an io, is just a memory location... as anything else
is... that the value of that memory location reflect or not an
external world... doesn't change anything from the POV of the program
reading it... so as the meaning must somehow be internal to the
program as to what that value at that memory location means for it.
That's like saying a neuron in your brain doesn't know anything. In a
sense it's true, but it obfuscates the source of meaning. What your
neurons, as a brain, know are things about the external world (external
to the brain) with which they interact. The "meaning" is internal in
the sense that it is represented by a pattern in the brain - but it is
only meaning because it has referents outside the brain. A brain that
had never had an environment with which to interact would not have
anything to represent and would contain no "meaning". It would be like
the computer running a random or unknowable program, or the rock that
computes everything.
Brent
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