On 26 Oct 2015, at 07:43, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 10/25/2015 11:32 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 26 October 2015 at 17:08, Bruce Kellett
<[email protected]> wrote:
On 26/10/2015 5:01 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 03:40:45PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
I think Carroll's Paradox (or 'What the Tortoise Said to Achilles')
effectively undermines computationalism, or any argument that
arithmetic is prior to physics.
See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_the_Tortoise_Said_to_Achilles
In order to escape the paradox, you have to resort to a formalist
approach, and that renders the formalism devoid of semantic content.
I don't see why that undermines computationalism. Could you please
expand?
Modus ponens is only a formal manipulation of symbols, with no
semantic content.
This is an argument John Searle has made. The problem is, the brain
can also be described as manipulating symbols with no semantic
content - so where does semantic content come from?
From interaction with a world.
That is the heart of mysticism. To belief, apparently partially
realized, that there is a God that we can talk with.
You are right the semantic comes from the existence of a world, or a
model (a structure which satisfies the constraints of the theory
(which are often demanding, especially the babies!)
But with computationalism, we, in the 3p communicable way, are finite
theories, and as far as we are consistent, we cannot prove that there
is a world, or that there is a model, or that there is God, or that
there is a truth.
That is the problem for the universal machines, they cannot prove that
worlds satisfying them exists.
Yet, they can develop such beliefs, as it can be shown, for much
simpler machines than ourselves, that such structures exists for them.
Arithmetic gives a law level non trivial notion of truth for the
execution of the programs, and we can actually accelerate the
interview of the universal machine by the use of the logic G (et all
its intensional variants).
Thanks to S4Grz, the first person is not a machine, nor anything that
the machine can describe in any third person way. Computationalism
saves the soul from any reductionist complete theory or even
definitions. It is a theorem of the machine, once you define the soul
by the "knower", and knowable by Theatetus's applied to Gödels'
beweisvar "beweisbar('p') & p".
A semantic is a reality. It is a structure which realize, satisfies a
proposition or a belief.
(Rational) knowledge would be when our (rational) belief are true. (in
this computationalist case: satisfied by the usual model (N, +, *)).
I have to go. (almost)
Bruno
Brent
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