On 17 Feb 2016, at 01:32, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Feb 16, 2016 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> for the afterlife question, the fact that primary matter
exist is relevant.
Untrue. Matter may or may not be primary, but the evidence is
overwhelming that it's needed for intelligence and consciousness
.
Evidence are only that human intelligence and consciousness need
matter. But even the arithmetical universal machine believe in matter,
and believe it needs matter, in a case where we can see that such
matter is not primary, but a mode of arithmetic. That counts as a
strong evidence that there is no primary matter, and it is confirmed
by the known physical laws.
For the afterlife and other forms of non technological immortality,
the absence of primary matter and the fact that matter is a creation
of the mind or the soul plays a key role.
> If it exist and play some role, it is better to say "no" to
the digitalist surgeon.
Untrue. Matter almost certainly is needed but we know for a fact
that particular matter used is not important because hydrogen atoms
constantly go in and our of our brains and bodies yet we still feel
like we're the same person. As far as the question of
consciousness is concerned the primacy of matter is irreverent but
its generic nature is not.
How could a universal Turing machine see the difference between
arithmetical and physical generic matter?
How can the machine M distinguish between RA emulating the Heisenberg
Matrix of the Milky way at a very fine graining and PU (Physical
Universal number) emulating that Matrix at the same fine graining level?
What would be the property of the generic that is not Turing emulable.
Existence? That would beg the question, and your argument would again
appeal to a metaphysical commitment only to make computationalism
sufficiently mysterious to throw a doubt on mechanism. If that was
possible, I would no more survive *qua computatio* (in virtue of some
computation being emulated in the sense of theoretical computer
science) but in virtue of some "god" (Primary matter).
>>> PA proves ~(2+3= 7), without any need of primary matter.
>> Who has Mr. PA proven that to?
> To us, we might say.
And we have brains made of matter that obeys the laws of
physics.
Sure, but not necessarily primary one.
> But PA proves to itself, no matter what.
One way to tell the difference between between interesting
insights and vacuous philosophical statements is to ask what would
change if the statement was not true. So how would things
change if that were not the case and Mr. PA was not completely
convinced that the proof was valid?
Gödel's theorem would be wrong, and more generally, that would entail
that 0 = 1, and most of science would be inconsistent. It is a theorem
of arithmetic that PA proves some theorem. Beweisbar (provable) is an
arithmetical predicate. You could have asked what would be the change
if 0 was equal to 1, or if Pythagorus theorem was false.
To be sure I interpret your "completely convinced" by "has been able
to provide a proof", when using the mathematical notions, and not the
physical instantiation (which would beg the question).
> it can be justified by any Löbian machine
Maybe that's true and any old Löbian machine lying around would
justify things, but unfortunately nobody except you knows want
Löbian machine is. And I'm no so sure about you.
I have defined them by any universal machine knowing that she is
universal, like PA, ZF, etc.
Equivalently, it is a universal machine which can prove p -> []p for
any p being a sigma_1 arithmetical proposition, and of course []p
abbreviates beweisbar('p'), and 'p' is the Gödel number of "p", or any
encoding of p in the language of that machine.
Such machine proves all formula []([]p -> p) -> []p, the formal
theorem of Löb, from which the whole set of modal views of the
machine are recovered.
All machine which can add and multiply becomes Löbian once they
"believe" in sufficiently string induction axiom, like PA.
Typically, RA is not Löbian, but does emulate all Löbian machines,
which are the internal observers that I interview.
Have you a problem with this? I guess you have missed many posts if
the notion of Löbian machine is still unclear to you. It is also
explained in basically all my papers and in the theses.
Of course anyone can forget a definition, and I will answer. A good
book is Mendelson's introduction to Mathematical Logic.
Bruno
John K Clark
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