On 2/22/2016 4:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
In the formal treatment, this is recovered by the fact that G* proves the extensional equivalence of all intensional variants of provability, and G* proves the non intensional equivalence of thoise variants, by constructively ascribing them different logics (intuitionistic/epistemological for the first person singular, quantum logic for first person plural and matter, etc.).
Interesting point, but why should we consider intensional non-equivalence to be anything more than a difference of description?
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