On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 4:35 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> > >>> >> >>> or put in another way, to the First Person Indeterminacy (FPI): the >>> fact that no machine can know *introspectively* which computations support >>> it among the infinitely many emulated >> >> > >> > >> The word "which" implies that only one was responsible, > > > > Why only one? > Why indeed! Why are you asking me? > > > It can be an infinite set of computations. > So the failure to be able to answer the question "which one?" does not portend some deep philosophical discovery, it's just a silly question. > > > > we are doing metaphysics or theology, not physics. > I know, and I think that's why we're not getting anywhere. Philosophers have not done any philosophy in at least 400 years and theologians have never done anything interesting. > > But my point is that we cannot use primitive matter to singularize > consciousness. > I don't know what " singularize consciousness " means and I don't care because I'm not talking about " primitive matter " and am not interested in it. >> >> >> The failure of step 3 means step 8 shows nothing. > > > > > Actually that is false, as step 8 is independent. > If no steps precede it why is it called "step 8"? I always thought 7 things proceeded 8. > > > If in Helsinki the guy predict "W v M", all copies will write in their > diaries: "I was > [blah blah blah]" > I'm sick to death of the Helsinki guy, and even more fed up with all those stupid personal pronouns with no clear referent in a "proof" that is supposed say something about the nature of personal identity! But if a name was used instead of a vague personal pronoun there would be no place to hide ambiguity and the silliness of the "proof" would be obvious to everyone. > > > arithmetic implies the existence of the appearance of matter. > There is at least as much evidence that you've got it backwards and matter implies the existence of arithmetic; but it would make no difference even if you're right, matter would still be needed for the existence of intelligence just as molecules are needed for the existence of water even though molecules are not fundamental. > >> >> Most mathematicians insist that mathematics is a language > > > > > That is false. Only non mathematicians speculate on this, and that has > been refuted by Gödel, > Godel proved that some things are true but cannot be asserted in mathematical language, but we've known for a very long time that exactly the same thing is true of the English language. For example: "Bruno Marchal cannot consistently assert this sentence ." It's true but Bruno Marchal cannot say it. It had been thought that mathematics avoided the frailties of human language but Godel proved that was not so. > >> >> so I don't see why it >> [mathematics] >> can't be used to write fantasy that corresponds to no physical reality >> just as English can. > > > > > If you think that 2+2=4 is a fantasy, then I am not sure I can explain you > anything. > I never said it was. 2+2=5 is a fantasy because 2 physical objects and 2 physical objects never equal 5 physical objects, and because 2+2=5 can produce logical contradictions, but 2+2=5 is still a equation written in the mathematical language. And many fictional books have plot hole, but they're still novels written in the English language. > > >>> >> >>> Turing's tape is not physical. >> >> >> >> >> Then it can't do anything. > > > > > It can't do anything physical > Then it can't do anything. > > > the goal has never been to do AI, but to solve the mind-body problem. > > You can't change the subject in the middle of a conversation. > When somebody makes a AI worthy of the name (probably in less than 40 years and possibly much less) the debate is over and so is the mind-body problem. > > > The existence of computer and of all stopping computations (the universal > dovetailing) can be proved in RA. > That's nice, but RA can't compute 2+2. > > > See Epstein & Carnielli's book > Epstein & Carnielli's book can't compute 2+2 either. > > > or the one by Boolos and Jeffrey. > Neither can the book by Jeffrey. > > > Or Martin Davis Dover's book "computability and Unsolvability". > The Martin Davis book can't compute worth a damn either, that's why INTEL is still in business. > > A theorem is not supposed to do computation. > A theorem is a program used by a brain made of matter that obeys the laws of physics to discover something true. And a program without a computer is totally useless. John K Clark > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
