On 23 Feb 2016, at 03:45, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> two identical computers, put in two different rooms can
generate the same consciousness
I agree.
> or put in another way, to the First Person Indeterminacy
(FPI): the fact that no machine can know *introspectively* which
computations support it among the infinitely many emulated
The word "which" implies that only one was responsible,
Why only one?
It can be an infinite set of computations. before you open the
envelop, your state is the same in all infinitely many computations,
so by above, your same consciousness (first person subjectivity) is
brought by all those computations, but when you open the envelop, one
infinity of computations gives "room 0" and another infinity gives
"room one", now, each of your copy have live a transition from "not
knowing what is in the envelope in front of them to "knowing it", the
consciousness has differentiated, but is still the same in infinities
of computations. each measurement made by the subject differentiate
its computation, but they remain infinitely many.
but you just said two or more can.
> In the formal treatment, this is recovered by the fact that
G* proves the extensional equivalence of all intensional variants of
provability, and G* proves the non intensional equivalence of thoise
variants,
That's nice, but proofs can't make calculations
Agreed, but they are not supposed to do proof. It is the object of the
proofs in this case (the machine, or the person associated to the
machine by the intensional nuance []p & p) which does things and lives
experience.
much less produce intelligence or consciousness, in every instance
to do that it takes matter that obeys the laws of physics. No
exceptions have ever been observed. None.
We deduce something in a theory. No need of experience at this stage.
Experiences are needed only to see if the physics brought by the
reasoning (the measure on the sigma_1 sentences) obeys the same laws
that we infer from observation, as it does until now.
> There are infinitely many changes in the matter which would
not affect change in the first person experience.
And there are infinitely many brain changes that
will change your personal experience, and any random change to the
brain, a bullet to the head for example, will almost certainly make
a change in the first person experience, and probably not for the
better.
OK, but the point remains that there is also an infinity of changes
which does not lead to a subjective differences, so we have to take
into account to evaluate the measure of changes in the experiences.
>> it seems like a very good bet indeed that matter is required
for your personal experience. But any matter will do because it's
generic.
> Including the matter which only appears to be material,
How would "matter which only appears to be material" differ from
matter that really is material?
The first one is entirely explained by a measure on immaterial
computations emulated in arithmetic (or any Turing-complete system),
the second one is extrapolated from finitely many observations and
assume primary (elements).
I hope that by matter really material, you are not coming back with
primitive matter, as you agreed that this does not make sense.
Physics is empirical and is all about appearances, if theory doesn't
match experiment then the theory has to go regardless of how
beautiful it is,
No problem with this, but we are doing metaphysics or theology, not
physics. It happens that the computationalist metaphysics implies the
physics, so we must extract physics, without cheating and looking at
the physical reality, and once it is done, then we can do the
comparison with nature.
and there is not a single confirming instance of a calculation being
made without the use of matter. None.
I guess you mean "physically made", but at this stage, we cannot use
"physically" and are concerned only with the computation emulated (in
the Church Turing sense) in the (tiny, sigma_1) arithmetical reality.
> but is really a projection of the first person, which makes
my point that, by being "generic", we get that matter does not need
to be assumed
That conclusion is illogical. The correct conclusion is no
particular atoms need to be assumed for first person experience
because none of them have our names scratched on them.
That can be a step toward the conclusion, but is not the conclusion,
which is that all appearances of atoms must be explained by the
statistics on all computations. Some predicted to me that this would
never work, as intuitively, we only make partial sum to get the
measure, when in QM, we lake sums and subtraction, but such
subtraction can appear by the fact that the logic of the matter ([]p &
<>t with p sigma_1, + others) get, by incompleteness, a quantization
and a quantum logic.
>>The irrelevant thing is that matter is primitive.
> Excellent. That is part of the point.
THEN STOP TALKING ABOUT PRIMITIVE MATTER!
?
But my point is that we cannot use primitive matter to singularize
consciousness. I need top talk about it to explain it does not exist,
or that it cannot be related to experiences.
If you agree that primitive matter does not exist, then we agree, and
I am no more sure what was your point.
The proof I gave is constructive: it explains (and give an algorithm)
to get epistemologically the physical laws from an ontology with
matter, that is, without primitive matter.
> But step 8 shows [...]
The failure of step 3 means step 8 shows nothing.
Actually that is false, as step 8 is independent.
But step 3 does not fail. I taught it since 1963, and has never been a
problem for anybody.
Your refutation are strikingly easy to refute. Give it again, and I
will easily point on the mistake, which usually confuse, at some
point, the diaries of the copies. If in Helsinki the guy predict "W v
M", all copies will write in their diaries: "I was correct". If they
wrote anything else, not all copies will write "I was correct". And
mechanism tells us that all copies have the right to call themselves a
continuation of the Helsinki guy, so ...
> The point is that once matter is no more primitive, it has to
be explained from some other science
If you are only interested in intelligence then the existence of
matter does not need to be explained.
It does, that is the point of the UDA, and we have refutated your
critics. I asked you to convince one guy and let that guy explains
your point, but nobody would do that, because attacking step 3 is just
ridiculous. As Kim said, it is explainable in highschool without
problem. You have yourself often get the point and then criticize it
as trivial, but that is the purpose of a reasoning, to cut the steps
in small obvious step.
If you can explain it then that's nice, if you can't then too bad,
but either way matter is necessary for intelligence or
consciousness
That is the point: arithmetic implies the existence of the appearance
of matter.
That is nice as primitive matter cannot do the job when we assume
mechanism. It would need to be non Turing emulable.
>> Primitive or not molecules are needed for water to exist
> But not for being wet.
One can't but many can, that's why I said molecules and not
molecule. And a computer scientist no more needs to explain the
existence of matter to make a AI than a hydraulic engineer
needs to explain the existence of water. to build a dam.
An architect does not need the theory that Earth is round. The old
theory that Earth is flat works very well, but that does not make the
Earth flat.
Our goal is not to do physics, still less engineering, but to solve
the mind-body problem, or the 1p/3p relation problem.
> it becomes a Matter-of-the Gap, like in bad theology
What other sort of theology is there except for bad?
I have discover recently the astonishing fact that even modern
mathematical logic is born from an attempt to do good neoplatonist
theology, by people like Benjamin Peirce, George Boole, De Morgan in
the 19th centuries. In fact mathematics has almost never been
separated from greek theology. It is a good thing that it has
eventually be separated, in the process of professionalization of
mathematics, but then, as we could have predicted, the field theology
has been made impossible to get some non confessional
professionalization, with the result that it stays in the hand of the
charlatan/politicians/clerics.
So platonist theology is good and fertile, it gave not just the whole
of math and physics, it gave explicitly the whole of mathematical
logic too. You might read:
COHEN, D. J. Equation from God, Pure Mathematics and Victorian faith.
John Hopkins, Baltimore 2007.
>> Harry Potter as depicted in in Rowling's books can
perform real magic every bit as well as a Turing Machine depicted in
a textbook on computer theory can perform real calculations.
> Yet, nobody complains when seeing a statement like x + 1 =
17 is soluble, when used in applied sciences. But try to publish a
paper in a science journal invoking Harry Potter's magic ...
That would be like publishing a scientific paper in a Harry Potter
book. English is a language and it can be used to write both
scientific papers and Harry Potter books. Most mathematicians insist
that mathematics is a language too,
That is false. Only non mathematicians speculate on this, and that has
been refuted by Gödel, but was already non sensical in number theory.
There is a mathematical languages, but that is not the same as a
mathematical theory, and even less the same that the interpretation of
that theory. a group is not a theory of group, a group is a structure
satisfying the axioms of theory of group.
so I don't see why it can't be used to write fantasy that
corresponds to no physical reality just as English can.
If you think that 2+2=4 is a fantasy, then I am not sure I can explain
you anything.
> So, I think that you are not correct here.The fact that 17 is
prime can have physical or biological consequences,
Granted, but much of modern higher mathematics is far far more
abstract baroque and convoluted than that! It could be that papers
on inaccessible cardinal numbers or the 196,883 dimensional Monster
Group have more in common with Rowling's Harry Potter than Darwin's
Origin Of Species.
If you find a theorem of representation if the Monster Group in harry
Potter, well, publish a paper, and that would made some aspect of
Harry Potter real. But you cannot speculate on a theorem not yet
proved to pretend that 2+2=4 is as much a fantasy than Harry Potter.
> but the fact that Potter can fly has none.
Well... the Potter books are the product of Rowling's physical
brain and they have influenced many millions of other physical
brains.
> Turing's tape is not physical.
Then it can't do anything.
It can't do anything physical with respect to itself, but it can
emulate the brain of someone in front of physically sensible things,
and the math shows that if mechanism is correct the physical is an
appearance emerging from the statistics on all computations, and this
has been confirmed until now.
> See how Matiyazevitch proves that any Turing machine can be
emulated by Diophantine equation, without any reference to
anything physical.
Then stop just talking about it and start the Diophantine Computer
Hardware Corporation. There would be no way you could avoid becoming
a trillionaire, not with zero manufacturing costs.
This has been already answered.
>> the fact that one beer plus one one beer is 2 beers will
effect my decision to have a third beer, but one rock plus one rock
equals 2 rocks will not. So apparently numbers can't tell the entire
physical story alone, something more is needed, something like
matter that obeys the laws of physics.
> You make my point: the Gödel number of your brain cannot
bring your state of mind without the relevant universal numbers, and
those must emerges from all the numbers getting at your state. So
physics must be reduced to a mathematical measure on the sigma_1
sentences,
As I've said nineteen dozen times its irrelevant if physics can
be reduced to sigma_1 sentences, or to something else, or to
nothing at all;
That is the result. Suddenly, the whole subject of the conversation is
irrelevant. That means that you are talking on something else, without
telling us.
if you want intelligence you're going to have to use matter that
obeys the laws of physics.
No problem with that. But the goal has never been to do AI, but to
solve the mind-body problem.
You can't change the subject in the middle of a conversation.
And even if it turns out that oxygen and hydrogen can be reduced to
sub sub sub microscopic strings if you want to understand water
you're still going to have to understand chemistry.
Sure. The point is that those strings, if confirmed, must be justified
in machine theology, which is a sub-branch of arithmetic or
combinatory algebra.
>> there is zero evidence that anything can emulate anything
unless matter that obeys the laws of physics is involved.
> You don't need evidence.
If it worked they'd be lots of evidence, but it doesn't so
there's not.
We don't need any evidence other that the fact that it is a theorem of
arithmetic. The existence of computer and of all stopping computations
(the universal dovetailing) can be proved in RA.
See Epstein & Carnielli's book, or the one by Boolos and Jeffrey. Or
Martin Davis Dover's book "computability and Unsolvability". They do
that very well.
> It is an elementary mathematical theorem, that arithmetic or
combinatory algebra emulate everything emulable.
The trouble is theorems can't calculate anything much less emulate
anything.
It is not the theorem which does the emulation. The theorem only
asserts that something arithmetic, relatively to something in
arithmetic emulates the calculation in the standard sense given by
Church, Turing, Post, etc.
A theorem can't do anything at all unless there is a brain made of
matter that obeys the laws of physics to think about it.
A theorem is not supposed to do computation. And here you are back
without saying with primitive matter, as it seems you speculate on it
to say that matter is needed. if not, then we agree, and you should
study how we get the appearance of matter, without assuming anything
made of primitive particles or something. the physics we get is purely
relational, like some physicist can believe already. But here, it is a
consequence of the mechanist theory of mind and person.
I think that your problem is not related with what I say, but with the
fact that I am the one saying it, as it looks we agree, but then you
change the subject of conversation, or make unclear critics which
attributes me things I have never said, like a theorem which would
compute, or a book which would compute, etc. I have never say that.
All I say is that mechanism forces an internal many-dreams
interpretation of arithmetic frrom which the laws of physics must be
recovered, and that it works until now, thanks to both Gödel's
incompleteness which brought exactly what we need, and quantum
mechanics which confirms both intuitively (the MW aspect) and formally
(the quantum logics).
Bruno
John K Clark
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