On 02 Jun 2016, at 19:30, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Jun 2, 2016 at 11:13 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
>> All the papers that I have seen written by you, or by
anybody else, are made of matter that obeys the laws of physics,
please point me to some that aren't but don't use matter to do so.
> But the' existence of papers is not part of the hypothesis
for developing the theory.
All the theories and all the hypotheses that have ever existed
were developed by brains made of matter that obey the laws of
physics, and the way they were communicated to other brains also
involved matter that obey the laws of physics. There are no
exceptions. None.
But computationalisme explains this *without* assuming *primary*
matter, and that was the point.
> The point is that IF electron are made of primary matter,
then computationalism is false.
That is ridiculous.
It is a logical consequence of Digital Mechanism (alias
computationalism) + a very weak form of Occam razor.
The chain of "what is this made of?" questions either comes to an
end or it does not, and either way computationalism is true.
In dreams, we see objects and tend to conceive them in the usual way,
as a sort of continuous/discrete volume apparently made of something.
But such objects in dream are hallucinations, and are not made-of-
something. If you prefer, as you know that computationalism entails
that it is in principle possible that I embed you in a computer,
without you being able to guess that this happened, for some finite
amount of time. Again, during that period you will see object exactly
as if they were made of things, but they are not.
Now, it is a theorem in (very) elementary arithmetic that (all)
computations exists. Roughly speaking Robinson Arithmetic can already
prove that each halting computation exists, and Peano Arithmetic (RA +
the induction axioms) proves that all computations exist. In
particular all models (semantics) of arithmetic *realise* all
computations.
You have to endow the universal Turing machine or number with magical
abilities for them to avoid arithmetical zombiness.
The problem for the universal machine is that her experience is
supported by an infinite of universal program/machine/number, so she
can only be on those who will exploit the first person randomness
which they can't avoid below their substitution level. That explains
the quantum appearance, especially that technically we get already the
big physical pattern: symmetry at the bottom, antisymmetry directly
above, the many-mind/state/world/histories inference, the existence of
quantization with quantum logic, etc.
Locally things are made of things, but fundamentally (assuming
computationalism) things are only invariant pattern emerging from the
sharable dreams.
> But "primary matter" is a notion in theology, never used in
physics, and to invoke it to refute an argument is the same as
saying that the theory of evolution is false because it failed to
explain how God created the humans. We call that "begging the
question".
Computationalism can explain how intelligent behavior works and
can do it in a way that can't be faked, by reproducing it in the
lab. And Evolution can show that intelligent behavior and
consciousness are inextricably linked. How on earth is that
begging the question?
I agree that intelligent behavior and self-consciousness are related,
but usually I mean by consciousness the subjective ability to
distinguish two things, usually the bad and the good, like between to
eat and to be eaten. As being subjective it is not entirely third
person descriptible as it will refer to some transcendental (with
respect to the system) notion of truth (No technical problem here as
this happened already in Computer science, and I exploit that to
distonguish what the machine can justify and not justify about its (8)
main self-referential modalities (the justifiable, the knowable, the
observable, the sensible). But then it will also be widespreadly
distributed on all universal number realizations, and we have to solve
the "measure" problem.
QM solves the measure problem, with Gleason theorem. But to solve the
computationalist consciousness/matter or first-person/third person
relation problem, we have to prove an equivalent of Gleason theorem
for the arithmetical reality (or any sigma_1 complete reality).
The result are encouraging, given that most "material" modalities does
provides quantum logics on which Hilbert Space or von Neumann algebra
might be applied to hopefully get the arithmetical Gleason theorem
from the original quasi-directly.
> If you agree that there is no Aristotelian matter
I do agree there is no Aristotelian matter and always have,
in fact I can't off the top of my head think of any physical notion
of Aristotle's that I agree with, and that's why I call Aristotle a
nitwit.
When you say "All the theories and all the hypotheses that have ever
existed were developed by brains made of matter that obey the laws of
physics, and the way they were communicated to other brains also
involved matter that obey the laws of physics. There are no
exceptions. None. ", that is exactly what we mean by "Aristotelian
Matter". It means that you think that the notion of matter must be
assumed as ontologically primitive. It excludes the theories in which
matter does not exist as ontological objects, but are appearances
emerging from something deeper and simpler (like some (neo)Pythagorean
thought).
> I have no need to argue more.
Good. I'm sick to death with idiot ancient Greeks!
But you do seem to borrow the main metaphysical axiom brought by a
philosopher: primary matter. many platonist try to convince Plato that
Aristotle should be bannished from the academy for that. primitive
matter is a good methodological simplifying hypothesis to study the
part of physics which do not rely too much on theology, but as both
computationalism makes necessary, and quantum mechanics makes
apparently possible, the days of that hypothesis are counted.
> Then the question is: where does the appearance of
aristotelian matter comes from.
It comes from nowhere because matter does not even appear to be
aristotelian, nothing in physics is aristotelian because
Aristotle was a nitwit.
He is at the origin of the physical science, and even of materialism
and physicalism, like Plato and its Pythagorean predecessors are at
the origin of mathematics, and some were open to arithmeticalism,
other to geometrism or more general mathematicalism, even musicalism.
Aristotle idea is that reality is WYSIWYG (what you see is what you get)
Plato is the more old skepticism of that instinct, and it is the idea
that the fundamental reality might be behind What We See. The
inspiration were notably numbers, geometry and music. The greeks were
amazed by simple arithmetic facts like the sum of the first n odd
numbers is a square (n^2).
>>>> Show me an example of material complexity but don't
use any material (and that includes electrons) when you do so.
>>> The atmoic physical proposition is given by the set of true
sigma_1 arithmetical sentences p (i.e. having the shape: ExP(x)
with P decidable) structured by the logic of Gödel's beweisbar
predicate (B) in the following variant: Bp & ~B~(p), or Bp & p, or
Bp & ~B~p & p.
>>No that just won't do,
> Proof?
Proof of what? Do you really doubt that electrons are
made of matter that obeys the laws of physics ?!
My opinion is private and of no interest.
What I have justified is that IF computationalism is assumed, THEN you
need to invoke an infinitely ad-hoc sort of God to prevent the
appearance of the physical laws from emerging from the number's
"dreams" statistics.
>> > > non material computations don't exist.
>>> In which theory?
>> In no theory, in something far more important, in
observation.
> How can you observe that computations do not exist in
arithmetic.
You can observe interactions using your physical eyes and think
about them using your physical brain.
I did exactly that in Geneva when working with the LARC. But I got the
parameters wrong, and ended creating a black hole engulfing quickly
the LARC, Geneva, Earth, ... Fortunately I wake up.
With computationalism, the term physical has to be explained. You do
need to fix your UDA-step 3 problem before to grasp that.
But you can't observe, even in theory,
computations that exist in arithmetic but not in physics;
and that is just another way of saying that such computations don't
exist.
Then prime numbers do not exist, etc. (I recall that we have already
accept things like prime numbers when defining the notion of
computation. Digital mechanism assumes natural numbers and simple laws
on them even if only to define what we mean by "digital", Church-
Turing thesis, programs, etc.).
> Something which is refuted in all textbook, also.
Textbooks made of matter that obey the laws of physics.
That is true. Yes.
That is non relevant, also.
You could criticize Group Theory as it fails to assume the existence
of the blackboard on which the axioms of groups are written.
You might not understand well what is a theory, or what are
theoretical assumptions. The universal of universal Turing machines,
and of universal Lisp Interpreter are theorem of Peano Arithmetic.
That is independent of the assumption that there is a (primitively or
not) physical universe in which we can reasonably implement for some
duration such universal numbers/machine/programs.
Computationalism explains the appearance of blackboards, and of
textbooks, without assuming the existence of blackboard and textbooks.
The measure problem comes from the fact that computationalism might
still produces too much "dreams", but incompleteness shows that this
is less obvious than it seems, and it justifies already that the
observable have the math shape needed for possible normal, stable and
continuous (first person) extensions.
The physical has a mathematical reason. It is a sort of derivative of
the universal mind (the mind of the universal Turing machine). That
follows from the UDA already. The interview of the Löbian machine
(infinite interview but well summed up by Solovay theorem with the
modal logic G and G*) illustrates and gives a precise arithmetical
sense for the observable and other modalities.
Bruno F Marchal
John K Clark
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