On 23/06/2016 3:04 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Jun 2016, at 04:08, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 21/06/2016 3:14 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 20 Jun 2016, at 04:00, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 20/06/2016 4:09 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
The alternative, which Bruno actually suggested once but disowns,
is for explanations to form a "virtuous circle" in which
everything is explained in terms of other things ultimately
forming loops: NUMBERS -> "MACHINE DREAMS" -> PHYSICAL -> HUMANS
-> PHYSICS -> NUMBERS I call this "virtuously circular" if it is
comprehensive so that everything is somewhere in the circle.
The thing about such a loop is that you can start at any point --
for instance, PHYSICAL, HUMANS, PHYSICS, or anywhere else. The
question then is whether this actually achieves you anything?
Just stop on the simplest theory.
"Simple" is an undefined term. You might think the integers are
simple, I might think that physics is simple. No-one is right in any
absolute sense.
Why? We can define a theory to be simpler than another if it has less
assumptions.
The primary criterion for the adequacy of a theory is that the theory be
consistent with the data. Simplicity is at best a secondary
consideration, and then largely in the eye of the beholder, or the way
in which the theory is formulated. It is like the choice of a coordinate
system for astronomy -- the calculation of the trajectory for an
earth-moon mission is extremely difficult in a coordinate system centred
on one of the moons of mars but quite simple in the coordinate system
centred on the earth. But the physics is the same whatever the
coordinate system. "Simplicity" is a loaded word, a word that should be
avoided.
Ig you can explain QM and consciousness from elementary arithmetic,
you make a gain compared to starting from physicalist QM, which
assumes Matter, QM (and thus arithmetic, as QM already assumes
arithmetic).
Well, you should formalize your theory so that we can at least compare.
My theory is that the external objective physical world exists,
independently of you or me, or even of consciousness. Consciousness
is a property of certain forms of matter, and matter achieves those
forms, and hence consciousness, by the process of evolution.
OK. So your theory asks for an ontological commitment in some Nature
or Matter, being independent of us.
And your theory requires an ontological commitment to the existence of
the integers. You don't actually have fewer ontological assumptions. Who
said that the integers are simpler than nature? A number theorist might
not agree! Note that the ontology is the integers, not some set of
axioms. Axioms are statements that are true of the pre-existing
integers, axioms are not ontological statements.
Then you know my point: you can't say yes to the doctor or you need to
refute Church Thesis.
I deny this. Saying yes to the doctor merely requires you to accept that
the functionality of the computer is the same as the functionality of
your brain. This is as possible in the physicalist account as in any
other. Why should not the physical world be Turing emulable? This might
not be true for a computationalist account, but I reject that account:
if physics can be seen as possible a simulation run by some alien
civilization, then physics is certainly Turing emulable.
You must get out of this habit of claiming that certain things are
impossible for the physicalist, while these things are merely impossible
*if you assume computationalism* The physicalist rejects
computationalism, so your "refutations" are baseless.
Mind (and consciousness) is a property of brains and other
configurations of matter that have similar functionality.
If the functionality is Turing emulable, then your theory cannot work,
without involving some non-Turing emulable element paying some role in
mind and matter to assure the identity link.
Rubbish. It is no different from your "yes, doctor" scenario. Requiring
"something" to assure the mind and matter identity link is pure dualism.
Nothing extra is required. There is no need for anything to be not
Turing emulable. Don't you understand? Once you have explained the
functionality, there is nothing left to explain -- there is no magical
mind-body link to explain -- that is dualism.
We learn about these things, and about the basis of consciousness,
empirically, by applying the scientific method in our study. There is
no "hard problem" of consciousness, because once we have understood
the functionality, we have understood all that there is to it.
The contrary happens. Once we understand the functionality, it looks
like if consciousness is no more needed, but then why would evolution
endows us with it?
Because consciousness is part of the functionality. There is no mystery
here, apart from that arising from your inherently dualist understanding
of consciousness.
That is the hard problem: solving the describable easy part of it
makes the harder part only more harder, ... until you get the
Theatetus point, and remind that a brain is supposed to have some
relation with truth.
What is truth? There has been a lot of progress in epistemology and the
notion of "truth" since Plato's time. Maybe you should get up to date.
There is no "hard problem"-- to think so is a simple category mistake.
Your "Yes, doctor" thought experiment is actually saying much the
same thing: the functionality is all that matters -- once you have
understood the function, you have understood consciousness. The
doctor doesn't have to transfer "your consciousness" once he has
replaced your brain with a functionally equivalent computer. There is
no duality.
Indeed, but there is still a sense in saying that the consciousness
has been preserved.
Your inherent dualism is showing again........ You separate
functionality and consciousness -- that is dualism.
And this will work if we accept that the brain does not produce
consciousness, it makes only possible for a consciousness (a person)
to manifest itself relatively to some computations shared with other
persons. But this eventually is what will make physics a dream-sharing
theory, if we do get the right relative measure when solving the
measure problem.
Get rid of the white rabbits, you mean? You can't do this, you know.
I have already give three equivalent version of "my" theory, which
is probably the same of yours minus assuming mind and matter and a
mysterious link between, as far as I understand.
As I understand it, your theory assumes the existence of numbers, or
at least of the integers. Your base ontology can be used to support
axioms, giving RA, PA and so on. Once you have some axioms and rules
of inference, you can prove theorems. You then identify "existence"
with the existential quantifier of mathematics -- if we can prove
Ex(x = y), then you say that y is also part of the ontology.
I would say only that if the machine M can prove Ex(x = y), the
machine will believe in the existence of y. Then it happens that all
humans believe in RA and PA, at least all those willing to give sense
to "digital mechanism", so if M proves Ex(x=y), we can take it as true.
Believing is not knowledge, and truth does not imply an ontology --
"triangles have three corners" is a true statement, whether or not
triangles exist in any objective sense.
But without assuming the numbers to start with, you can never get to
theorems and the existential quantifier.
That is why I assume x + 0 = x, etc.
The existential quantifier merely points to an already existing entity.
We can say Ex(x^2 = 4) only because the integer 2 already exists. It is
a pointer, not an ontological operator!
The existential quantifier is not then a definition of what
"existence" consists in.
It is the simplest one, as I can explain in very simple conceptual
term the theological and the physical existence (notably by the simple
arithmetical modal [i]Ex[i]P(x), and [i]<i>Ex[i]<i>x.
If physicall real atoms are supposed as fiundamental, I might need to
define the numbers by brain configuration of apes, and get the
definition of zero with a many volumes book reducing the ape's brain
to superstring theory, and this in a version of superstring theory
never assuming natural or integers.
If you use superstring theory then you are most likely wrong! No, all
you need is a physics in which the basic endurance of objects is ensured
by symmetries and Noether's theorem.
Your ontology is assumed before you get that far, before you have
arithmetic even.
?
What I said above: you have to assume the existence of at least the
integers before any arithmetic can get off the ground.
So you are actually no better off than the physicalist -- you still
have to assume a primitive ontology:
Yes. Without some theory, we don't have a theory. We need to agree on
somethings. But my theory is just elementary arithmetic. It is
believed by everybody (except sunday philosophers), and it is assumed
by physicists too.
No, your ontology is the integers, and these are not assumed by
physicists -- integers are derived by physicists from experience of the
physical world.
this might form a model for arithmetic,
The (standard) model is the well known structure (N, 0, +, *). It was
taught in high school explcitly sometimes ago.
but then so does the physical universe.
To assume an ontologically physical universe at the start is no
better, for me, than to say God made it.
God made the integers, all else is the work of men! "Die ganzen Zahlen
hat der liebe Gott gemacht, alles andere ist Menschenwerk". (Kronecker)
Anyway, I thought naively for a long time that all scientists knew
that as long as the mind-body problem is not solved, we should be open
to change our mind of what is more fundamental (number, matter, mind,
etc.)
The physical has the property of containing distinct objects -- hence
already has an ontology of integers, but in addition, things exist in
the physical universe without the superstructure of axioms and
theorems -- we just look and see! Physicalism is actually simpler!
Grandmother theory of gravitation (everything falls down if not
supported) is simpler than Einstein's theory. Then.
The goal is the search of the truth.
What is truth? The physicist only seeks theories that are not
contradicted by the data -- "truth" is an optional extra!
And my point is just that mechanism is incompatible with materialism,
and that we can test them experimentally.
I don't defend any truth anywhere.
So don't talk about it so much, and don't criticize alternative theories
just because they are incompatible with your theory.
I provide a reasoning only. Then I explain that QM (without collapse)
provides evidence for mechanism, and thus again (weak) materialism.
That is why I like computationalism: it makes a large part of
philosophy, metaphysics and theology experimentally testable.
Until you have some solid predictions that are different from those of a
materialistic theory, and your predictions are borne out by experiment,
you don't have anything of any particular value.
Bruce
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