On Wed, Jun 22, 2016 at 8:01 PM, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 23/06/2016 3:04 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 21 Jun 2016, at 04:08, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > On 21/06/2016 3:14 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 20 Jun 2016, at 04:00, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > On 20/06/2016 4:09 am, Brent Meeker wrote: > > The alternative, which Bruno actually suggested once but disowns, is for > explanations to form a "virtuous circle" in which everything is explained > in terms of other things ultimately forming loops: NUMBERS -> "MACHINE > DREAMS" -> PHYSICAL -> HUMANS -> PHYSICS -> NUMBERS I call this > "virtuously circular" if it is comprehensive so that everything is > somewhere in the circle. > > > The thing about such a loop is that you can start at any point -- for > instance, PHYSICAL, HUMANS, PHYSICS, or anywhere else. The question then is > whether this actually achieves you anything? > > > Just stop on the simplest theory. > > > "Simple" is an undefined term. You might think the integers are simple, I > might think that physics is simple. No-one is right in any absolute sense. > > > Why? We can define a theory to be simpler than another if it has less > assumptions. > > > The primary criterion for the adequacy of a theory is that the theory be > consistent with the data. Simplicity is at best a secondary consideration, > and then largely in the eye of the beholder, or the way in which the theory > is formulated. It is like the choice of a coordinate system for astronomy > -- the calculation of the trajectory for an earth-moon mission is extremely > difficult in a coordinate system centred on one of the moons of mars but > quite simple in the coordinate system centred on the earth. But the physics > is the same whatever the coordinate system. "Simplicity" is a loaded word, > a word that should be avoided. > When two theories have equal explanatory power, but one has added assumptions, the theory with fewer assumptions is preferred. > > > > Ig you can explain QM and consciousness from elementary arithmetic, you > make a gain compared to starting from physicalist QM, which assumes Matter, > QM (and thus arithmetic, as QM already assumes arithmetic). > > Well, you should formalize your theory so that we can at least compare. > > > My theory is that the external objective physical world exists, > independently of you or me, or even of consciousness. Consciousness is a > property of certain forms of matter, and matter achieves those forms, and > hence consciousness, by the process of evolution. > > > OK. So your theory asks for an ontological commitment in some Nature or > Matter, being independent of us. > > > And your theory requires an ontological commitment to the existence of the > integers. You don't actually have fewer ontological assumptions. Who said > that the integers are simpler than nature? A number theorist might not > agree! Note that the ontology is the integers, not some set of axioms. > Axioms are statements that are true of the pre-existing integers, axioms > are not ontological statements. > The electron is a mathematical object. It has a quantum state that consists of complex/real numbers, bits, etc. To assume the electron is to bring with it the assumption of all the math necessary to describe it (which is a lot): [image: Inline image 1] From: http://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/toe.gif Consider that in relation to the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mathphil-indis/>: > (P1) We ought to have ontological commitment to all and only the entities > that are indispensable to our best scientific theories. > (P2) Mathematical entities are indispensable to our best scientific > theories. > (C) We ought to have ontological commitment to mathematical entities. Then you see, you are deciding between an obviously simpler theory and a more complex one: Theory A: Physical reality exists *and* Mathematical entities exist Theory B: Mathematical entities exist If Theory B can be shown to lead to the same outcomes, observations, etc. as theory A, then obviously B is a preferable theory, unless you disagree with Occam, Newton, Einstein, etc. on the preferability of simpler theories. > > Then you know my point: you can't say yes to the doctor or you need to > refute Church Thesis. > > > I deny this. Saying yes to the doctor merely requires you to accept that > the functionality of the computer is the same as the functionality of your > brain. This is as possible in the physicalist account as in any other. Why > should not the physical world be Turing emulable? This might not be true > for a computationalist account, but I reject that account: if physics can > be seen as possible a simulation run by some alien civilization, then > physics is certainly Turing emulable. > > You must get out of this habit of claiming that certain things are > impossible for the physicalist, while these things are merely impossible > *if you assume computationalism* The physicalist rejects computationalism, > so your "refutations" are baseless. > > > > Mind (and consciousness) is a property of brains and other configurations > of matter that have similar functionality. > > > If the functionality is Turing emulable, then your theory cannot work, > without involving some non-Turing emulable element paying some role in mind > and matter to assure the identity link. > > > Rubbish. It is no different from your "yes, doctor" scenario. Requiring > "something" to assure the mind and matter identity link is pure dualism. > Nothing extra is required. There is no need for anything to be not Turing > emulable. Don't you understand? Once you have explained the functionality, > there is nothing left to explain -- there is no magical mind-body link to > explain -- that is dualism. > > > We learn about these things, and about the basis of consciousness, > empirically, by applying the scientific method in our study. There is no > "hard problem" of consciousness, because once we have understood the > functionality, we have understood all that there is to it. > > > The contrary happens. Once we understand the functionality, it looks like > if consciousness is no more needed, but then why would evolution endows us > with it? > > > Because consciousness is part of the functionality. There is no mystery > here, apart from that arising from your inherently dualist understanding of > consciousness. > > That is the hard problem: solving the describable easy part of it makes > the harder part only more harder, ... until you get the Theatetus point, > and remind that a brain is supposed to have some relation with truth. > > > What is truth? There has been a lot of progress in epistemology and the > notion of "truth" since Plato's time. Maybe you should get up to date. > There is no "hard problem"-- to think so is a simple category mistake. > > > > Your "Yes, doctor" thought experiment is actually saying much the same > thing: the functionality is all that matters -- once you have understood > the function, you have understood consciousness. The doctor doesn't have to > transfer "your consciousness" once he has replaced your brain with a > functionally equivalent computer. There is no duality. > > > Indeed, but there is still a sense in saying that the consciousness has > been preserved. > > > Your inherent dualism is showing again........ You separate functionality > and consciousness -- that is dualism. > > And this will work if we accept that the brain does not produce > consciousness, it makes only possible for a consciousness (a person) to > manifest itself relatively to some computations shared with other persons. > But this eventually is what will make physics a dream-sharing theory, if we > do get the right relative measure when solving the measure problem. > > > Get rid of the white rabbits, you mean? You can't do this, you know. > > > > I have already give three equivalent version of "my" theory, which is > probably the same of yours minus assuming mind and matter and a mysterious > link between, as far as I understand. > > > As I understand it, your theory assumes the existence of numbers, or at > least of the integers. Your base ontology can be used to support axioms, > giving RA, PA and so on. Once you have some axioms and rules of inference, > you can prove theorems. You then identify "existence" with the existential > quantifier of mathematics -- if we can prove Ex(x = y), then you say that y > is also part of the ontology. > > > I would say only that if the machine M can prove Ex(x = y), the machine > will believe in the existence of y. Then it happens that all humans believe > in RA and PA, at least all those willing to give sense to "digital > mechanism", so if M proves Ex(x=y), we can take it as true. > > > Believing is not knowledge, and truth does not imply an ontology -- > "triangles have three corners" is a true statement, whether or not > triangles exist in any objective sense. > > But without assuming the numbers to start with, you can never get to > theorems and the existential quantifier. > > > That is why I assume x + 0 = x, etc. > > > The existential quantifier merely points to an already existing entity. We > can say Ex(x^2 = 4) only because the integer 2 already exists. It is a > pointer, not an ontological operator! > > The existential quantifier is not then a definition of what "existence" > consists in. > > > It is the simplest one, as I can explain in very simple conceptual term > the theological and the physical existence (notably by the simple > arithmetical modal [i]Ex[i]P(x), and [i]<i>Ex[i]<i>x. > > If physicall real atoms are supposed as fiundamental, I might need to > define the numbers by brain configuration of apes, and get the definition > of zero with a many volumes book reducing the ape's brain to superstring > theory, and this in a version of superstring theory never assuming natural > or integers. > > > If you use superstring theory then you are most likely wrong! No, all you > need is a physics in which the basic endurance of objects is ensured by > symmetries and Noether's theorem. > > > Your ontology is assumed before you get that far, before you have > arithmetic even. > > > ? > > > What I said above: you have to assume the existence of at least the > integers before any arithmetic can get off the ground. > > > So you are actually no better off than the physicalist -- you still have > to assume a primitive ontology: > > > Yes. Without some theory, we don't have a theory. We need to agree on > somethings. But my theory is just elementary arithmetic. It is believed by > everybody (except sunday philosophers), and it is assumed by physicists too. > > > No, your ontology is the integers, and these are not assumed by physicists > -- integers are derived by physicists from experience of the physical world. > > > this might form a model for arithmetic, > > > The (standard) model is the well known structure (N, 0, +, *). It was > taught in high school explcitly sometimes ago. > > but then so does the physical universe. > > > To assume an ontologically physical universe at the start is no better, > for me, than to say God made it. > > > God made the integers, all else is the work of men! "Die ganzen Zahlen hat > der liebe Gott gemacht, alles andere ist Menschenwerk". (Kronecker) > > > Anyway, I thought naively for a long time that all scientists knew that as > long as the mind-body problem is not solved, we should be open to change > our mind of what is more fundamental (number, matter, mind, etc.) > > > The physical has the property of containing distinct objects -- hence > already has an ontology of integers, but in addition, things exist in the > physical universe without the superstructure of axioms and theorems -- we > just look and see! Physicalism is actually simpler! > > > Grandmother theory of gravitation (everything falls down if not supported) > is simpler than Einstein's theory. Then. > > The goal is the search of the truth. > > > What is truth? The physicist only seeks theories that are not contradicted > by the data -- "truth" is an optional extra! > > And my point is just that mechanism is incompatible with materialism, and > that we can test them experimentally. > > I don't defend any truth anywhere. > > > So don't talk about it so much, and don't criticize alternative theories > just because they are incompatible with your theory. > > > I provide a reasoning only. Then I explain that QM (without collapse) > provides evidence for mechanism, and thus again (weak) materialism. > > That is why I like computationalism: it makes a large part of philosophy, > metaphysics and theology experimentally testable. > > > Until you have some solid predictions that are different from those of a > materialistic theory, and your predictions are borne out by experiment, you > don't have anything of any particular value. > Simpler theories, especially when they explain more, are always of value. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
