On 24 Jun 2016, at 08:42, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 24/06/2016 3:32 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Jun 2016, at 03:01, Bruce Kellett wrote:
..... if physics can be seen as possible a simulation run by some
alien civilization, then physics is certainly Turing emulable.
Which is not the case. The alien can fail us only for a finite time.
Prove that without assuming computationalism. What in our physical
world is not Turing emulable?
Consciousness, and the appearance of primary matter (probably the
phenomenological "collapse").
What could not be simulated by an alien running a simulation on a
physical computer? Prove that we are not brains-in-a-vat.
If Nature satisfies qZ1*, then we can take that as an evidence we are
at the physical bottom, which means we are in infinitely many "brain
in a vat" in arithmetic.
If Nature violate qZ1*, then: either computationalism is wrong, of we
are in a brain in vat made by people closer to the bottom.
Or maybe computationalism is the same as brains-in-a-vat --
consciousness and the physical world are both merely illusions.
Consciousness is certainly not an illusion, as it is a form of
knowledge, linked to truth by definition. And that mirrors the fact
that we cannot doubt being conscious, given than a genuine doubt
require consciousness. Consciousness can be defined by []p & p, with p
= t, at least for a first approximation, and this makes it non
definable in arithmetic, yet unavoidable for all universal numbers,
and this knowingly so for the Löbian numbers. The physical is an
illusion, if you want, but a lawful persistent one, and we can compare
its structure with what we actually observe.
Bruno
Bruce
I explain that to Brett Hall: but computationalism makes it
possible to see if we are in a normal emulation, or at the physical
bottom, the things which is the first person sum on all emulations
(by the FPI).
The phenomenal physics is not entirely Turing emulable, but that
might be no more than the presence of a random oracle on some near-
equivalent computations.
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