On 25/06/2016 1:36 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Jun 2016, at 08:42, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 24/06/2016 3:32 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Jun 2016, at 03:01, Bruce Kellett wrote:

..... if physics can be seen as possible a simulation run by some alien civilization, then physics is certainly Turing emulable.

Which is not the case. The alien can fail us only for a finite time.

Prove that without assuming computationalism. What in our physical world is not Turing emulable?

Consciousness, and the appearance of primary matter (probably the phenomenological "collapse").

Comnsciousness is not Turing emulable? You had better say "No" to the doctor, then. Primary matter might be a problem only if you assume computationalism. But if you don't assume computationalism, you have no problems.


What could not be simulated by an alien running a simulation on a physical computer? Prove that we are not brains-in-a-vat.

If Nature satisfies qZ1*, then we can take that as an evidence we are at the physical bottom, which means we are in infinitely many "brain in a vat" in arithmetic.

Rubbish. I thought it was part of your argument that we can't know what substrate our computations are running on -- there is no difference between the physical brain and the computer simulation (at the correct level). In that case, we can never know that we are not a BIV, or that we are not part of a simulation run by some alien civilization.

If Nature violate qZ1*, then: either computationalism is wrong, of we are in a brain in vat made by people closer to the bottom.

Computationalism could well be wrong,and we could still be BIVs.

Or maybe computationalism is the same as brains-in-a-vat -- consciousness and the physical world are both merely illusions.

Consciousness is certainly not an illusion, as it is a form of knowledge, linked to truth by definition. And that mirrors the fact that we cannot doubt being conscious, given than a genuine doubt require consciousness. Consciousness can be defined by []p & p, with p = t, at least for a first approximation, and this makes it non definable in arithmetic, yet unavoidable for all universal numbers, and this knowingly so for the Löbian numbers. The physical is an illusion, if you want, but a lawful persistent one, and we can compare its structure with what we actually observe.

So you grant priority to what we observe? Just as well, because that is what is basic. As Brent says, consciousness in isolation is nothing -- we have to be conscious of something, and the only thing we can be conscious of is the physical world. The external world is, therefore, essential for the existence of consciousness, and it is logically prior. One is necessarily as sure of the external world as one is of being conscious, the external defines the conscious state: 1p does not exist without the corresponding 3p.

Bruce

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Reply via email to