On 29 Jul 2016, at 04:32, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 7/28/2016 6:55 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/07/2016 5:56 am, John Clark wrote:
If computationalism is correct then everything about "you" can
be duplicated as long at the atoms have the correct position and
velocity, not almost everything, not everything except for the 1-
view, EVERYTHING! If the machine can't do that then
computationalism is wrong, but you can't
just assume computationalism can't do something (like
duplicate the 1-view pov) and then claim you've proven something
about computationalism.
Except that you have provided no evidence that it is not true,
you just assume it's not true ( by assuming " The duplicating
machine never duplicates the 1-view from the 1-view
pov ") and then a few steps later claim to
have proven something.
That is an interesting point. If I have understood Bruno correctly,
his claim is that by computationalism, 'you' are the sum over all
computations passing through your conscious state, or something
similar. Consequently, if 'you' are duplicated in complete detail,
then you have nothing more than yet another computation that passes
through your conscious state, so there can be only one consciousness!
The fact that these duplicates might see different cities becomes
irrelevant because other computations that pass through my current
conscious state might correspond to computations relevant to other
cities, universes, or whatever (physics is only the 'statistics'
over such multiple computations). After the duplication, there is
still only one consciousness, albeit in a divided body. So the one
consciousness does see both cities at once. This possibility cannot
be ruled out a priori -- that might in fact be the result of such a
duplication experiment. I think this is a question that can
only be resolved empirically -- produce a person duplicating
machine and see what happens!
Computationalism must entail that running the same computation
twice necessarily produces (numerically) the same consciousness,
so, despite what Bruno claims, entirely faithful duplication of a
person does not produce another consciousness (or another 1-view
from the 3p perspective),
It's not the duplication that is supposed to produce another person,
it's the divergence of experiences,
Exactly. It is the divergence of the [computations+inputs], which
leads, by computationalism, to the divergence of experience.
and perhaps also physics that is below or indirectly related
conscious experience.
On all more realist protocol, that is part of what will be proved,
given that in this thread we are at step 3. But what you say is proven
eventually indeed.
This is what makes you a different person from who you were in the
past.
Not a different person in the sense of the personal identity (or step
1 is false!). But a different person-state (of the same person) in the
sense that you are different befoire and after drinking a cup of
coffee. OK.
But I agree that it might not be the case empirically. Bruno, based
on his experimentation with salvia, seems to think there is some
essence or soul of Bruno which is indepedent of his memories and
hence of his past experience. If it's independent of experience
then it can't be bifurcated by experience.
Sure, but salvia has nothing to do with this. It has only to do with
the global, absolute notion of person, which is not used in UDA, nor
AUDA, discovered 40 years before! The soul, here, is just the owner of
the 1p experience. To believe in it is a direct consequence of
computationalism.
Bruno
Brent
it merely increases the chances that the one consciousness survives
in an uncertain world. (The one consciousness may inhabit two
physical bodies, but computationalism claims that it is the
computation that constitutes consciousness, not the physical
location, substrate, or number of copies of that computation.)
Bruce
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