On Thu, Jul 28, 2016 at 10:32 PM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>
> It's not the duplication that is supposed to produce another person,
That's right, and the reason is the duplicating machine duplicates
everything about you, not almost everything, *EVERYTHING*. So there are 2
bodies having identical thoughts and feelings running in parallel, and
because we don't have thoughts and feelings we are thoughts and feelings,
and because of Leibniz's
identity of indiscernibles
we must conclude that there is one person with 2 identical bodies running
in parallel. Only when the bodies start to experience different things,
like one seeing Moscow and the other seeing Washington, do they diverge
into 2 separate individuals, although they will always have the same origin
story, they both have equally strong memories of being the Helsinki man,
and that means both the Washington man and the Moscow man are the Helsinki
man; although the Washington man is most certainly *NOT* the Moscow man. So
"what one and only one city will the Helsinki man see?" is just a silly
question, and assigning probabilities to what will happen to "him" is even
sillier in a world that has a personal pronoun duplicating machine in it.
All of the above predisposes that the duplicating machine really can
duplicate *EVERYTHING* about you; if computationalism is correct then it
can, if it's not then it can't. I think it can, and that's why I spent
$80,000 to have my brain frozen in liquid nitrogen when I die.
John K Clark
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